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ABSTRACT
SPLITTING AND SELF- SCHEMATA
MAY 1996
JOSEPH A. BOUSQUET, B.S., FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
M.S.W., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Sheldon Cashdan
Two studies test the idea that the psychoanalytic
defense of splitting involves alternating activation of
global, opposing self -schemata, including a good- self
schema, and a bad-self schema. Subjects were chosen on the
basis of scoring very low or very high on Sharon Gerson's
(1984) Splitting Scale, allowing frequent splitters (FS) and
infrequent splitters (IS) to be contrasted on a variety of
experimental measures. Subjects were asked to rate their
schematicism on a variety of trait dimensions and to rate
two characters in a Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) card on
the same dimensions. They were also asked to judge whether
perceptibly and subliminally presented trait adjectives were
best characterized as me or not me.
Results indicate that IS identify themselves more
schematically than FS on the trait dimensions good, bad,
loving, and hateful. FS showed longer average reaction
latencies in the me/not me judgment tasks, but there was no
vi
consistent evidence that either group enjoyed a speed
advantage in responding to trait terms of interest when
response times were standardized. These results suggest that
FS are not more schematic than IS on the trait dimensions
listed above.
On the other hand, FS did tend to differentiate TAT
characters more on the trait dimensions under study than IS,
an indication that they projected split object relations
onto the neutral TAT stimulus card. FS also showed a greater
tendency to respond nonrandomly to the trait terms good and
loving when these were presented subliminally
,
suggesting a
greater degree of priming on these trait dimensions.
The mixed results suggest that although splitting
cannot be conceptualized in the schematic terms proposed at
the outset of the study, further research into differences
in the information processing advantages of FS on the trait
dimensions good, bad, loving, and hateful is warranted.
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CHAPTER 1
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this chapter I discuss the Psychoanalytic concept of
splitting, distinguishing normal developmental splitting,
normal defensive splitting and borderline splitting. I then
propose links between splitting and research in social
cognition dealing with self -schemata and the complexity of
self -representations
.
Freud's Splitting of Consciousness
The modern concept of splitting has roots extending at
least as far back as Janet, who believed that classical
hysteria resulted from a splitting of the contents of
consciousness attributable to "an inborn weakness in the
capacity for psychical synthesis..." (Freud, 1955a, p. 49).
In Studies of Hysteria, written between 1893 and 1895,
Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud also recognized a splitting
of consciousness in hysteria. They claimed that unlike the
everyday "psychical groups" of associated memories,
thoughts, and affects accessible from states of normal
consciousness, the split-off psychical groups of the
hysteric were accessible only within altered states of
consciousness--Freud's (1955a) so-called "hypnoid states".
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In addition to the remarkable conversion symptoms Anna
0. suffered, Breuer and Freud {1955, p. 24) described
...entirely distinct states of consciousness... which
alternated very frequently and without warning and
which became more and more differentiated in the course
of the illness. In one of these states she recognized
her surroundings; she was melancholy and anxious, but
relatively normal. In the other state she hallucinated
and was ' naughty '- -that is to say, she was abusive,
used to throw the cushions at people ... [and] tore
buttons off her bedclothes and linen. . . There were
extremely rapid changes of mood. . . At moments when her
mind was quite clear she would complain of the profound
darkness in her head, of not being able to think, of
becoming blind and deaf, of having two selves, a real
one and an evil one which forced her to behave badly,
and so on.^
Unlike Janet, for whom split consciousness was
essentially congenital, Breuer and Freud viewed it as a
secondary manifestation of a more basic defensive process:
In contradistinction to Janet's view, which seems to me
to admit of many and various objections, we have that
advocated by J. Breuer in our joint publication.
According to Breuer, the "foundation and condition" of
hysteria is the occurrence of peculiar dream-like
states of consciousness with diminished capacity for
association, for which he suggests the name "hypnoid
states." The splitting of consciousness is then
secondary and acquired; it occurs because the ideas
which emerge in hypnoid states are cut off from
associative connection with the remaining contents of
consciousness (Freud, 1955a, p. 49)
.
' The reader may detect similarities here with more
recent descriptions of multiple personality and dissociative
disorders. Unfortunately, the theoretical relationship
between splitting, dissociation, and multiple personality
formation remains ill-defined a century after Breuer and
Freud's collaboration (e.g., Berman, 1981; Armstrong et al.,
1990)
.
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In hypnoid states Breuer and Freud {1955, p. 12)
contended that:
...the ideas which emerge... are very intense but are
cut off from associative communication with the rest of
the content of consciousness. Associations may take
place between these hypnoid states, and their
ideational content can in this way reach a more or less
high degree of psychical organization.
Such splits were not necessarily complete or entirely
irreversible
:
The nature of these states and the extent to which they
are cut off from the remaining conscious processes must
be supposed to vary just as happens in hypnosis, which
ranges from a light drowsiness to somnambulism, from
complete recollection to total amnesia (Breuer &
Freud, 1955, p. 12)
.
Freud soon clarified that splitting of consciousness
was not a necessary outcome in hysteria. In The Defence
Neuro-Psychoses Freud argued that there were three types of
hysteria, only two of which resulted in split consciousness.
Hypnoid Hysteria, already discussed, involved split
consciousness secondary to hypnoid states. On the other
hand, Freud did not see split consciousness playing any
notable role in pure retention hysterias , in which the only
problem was nonresponse to a trauma, and for which simple
abreaction was considered a cure (Freud, 1955a)
.
As in the case of hypnoid hysteria, Freud's defence
hysteria did involve splitting of the contents of
consciousness, but here it was viewed as the
consequence of a voluntary act on the part of the
patient; that is to say, it is instituted by an effort
of will, the motive of which is discoverable. By this I
do not of course mean that the patient intends to
3
produce a splitting of his consciousness; the patient's
aim is a different one, but instead of attaining its
end it produces a splitting of consciousness
(Freud, 1955a, p. 49)
.
This descriptions of defense hysteria anticipates a
very important aspect of the modern concept of splitting.
Where there is will, there is also a degree of
consciousness. As noted by Masterson (1976, p. 57), although
...the function of [splitting]... is to keep contradictory
primitive affective states [and self and object
representations mutually linked with these affective states]
separated from each other. . . both states remain in
consciousness but do not influence each other [italics
added]
.
This leads to an interesting point. With heavy,
continued use of splitting, there is a parallel development
of contradictory self -representations, each involving its
own distinctive set of cognitive and affective components.
When one self -representation is activated, the other is de-
activated. Being de-activated, however, does not mean it is
completely out of consciousness. To the contrary, a person
who is splitting is always at least preconscious of the de-
activated self -representation.
This makes splitting a rather shaky defense if the
purpose is to avoid awareness of conflict. People who use
splitting as a primary defense (e.g., borderlines), are
vulnerable to collapse of defensive capacity whenever
aspects of the currently de-activated self -representation is
brought to full awareness, thus conflicting with a current
contradictory self -representation . A typical secondary
4
defense, at this point, is isolation of affect, in which
affect is decoupled from cognition, resulting in denial of
the emotional significance of the cognitively acknowledged
contradiction (Kernberg, 1976)
.
Guided by the evolving topographic model, Freud soon
turned his energies to the study of repression, a more
efficient and adaptive defense than splitting of
consciousness. In contrast to splitting of consciousness,
repression produced true unconsciousness of unwanted aspects
of self or others, while simultaneously permitting partial,
symbolic expression of whatever was repressed. Rather than
the parallel development of contradictory ego states and
self -schemata, repression permitted one to develop a much
more coherent sense of self.
Freud's decision to focus on repression was largely
strategic; by assuming that most mentally disturbed people
had intact egos (and, implicitly, singular conscious
selves) , Freud was able to push classical drive theory to
its limit. By the 1930s, however, many psychoanalytic
thinkers realized that some mental disorders- -what are now
considered character disorders, for example- -could not be
effectively treated using only strictly traditional
psychoanalytic methods. Once the problem was identified as
the lack of intact egos in these "unanalyzable patients,"
psychoanalysis became preoccupied with problems of ego
development
.
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It was in this context that Freud expanded on the
original notion of defense hysteria, noting that ego could
divide defensively, with opposing memories, thoughts,
affects, and fantasies attaching to the part -egos. This
position, anticipating modern theories of splitting in the
so-called borderline character disorders, reflected Freud's
recognition that a defense operation could cause something
even more profound than analyzable neurotic symptoms --in
essence, a division of the self, or "ego-splitting" (Freud,
1955b, 1955c)
.
Developmental Splitting
Before discussing defensive splitting in adults, it
should be emphasized that most psychoanalytic thinkers
believe that normal childhood splitting plays a critical
role in the development of cognitive representations of self
and others
.
By 1921, Melanie Klein believed that at a certain point
in development young children split the internal psychic
representations of a parent in order to avoid premature
contamination of the "good parent" from less savory
representations of the same figure (Klein, 1950)
.
The child's inner world was considered to be as much a
source of potential negative associations with parental
representations as the real behavior of the parent. As Klein
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(1955) later proposed, projective identification, primarily
involving the splitting off and projection of the ego's
aggressive tendencies, was as central to the so-called
paranoid- schizoid stage of development as was splitting, per
se
.
Klein believed that in permitting the ego to retain a
central good object (the "good breast") around which it
could ultimately organize benign object relations, normal
infantile splitting paradoxically facilitated longer term
integration. Normal splitting gave the developing child
contrasting self -representations and contrasting object
representations with which it could unambiguously associate
any of the widely varying phenomenological experiences it
encountered. Thus, most of the child's experience could
remain obj ect- related
.
Klein saw such splits resolving dialectically in a
normal developmental course. Normal splitting bought the
developing ego time to mature to a point at which its
integrative capacity could undo the early splitting and
produce unified, ambivalently experienced internalized
representations of both self and significant objects- -a
precondition of the more developmental ly advanced depressive
position (Klein, 1955)
.
Unfortunately, the schism between followers of Klein
and those of Anna Freud delayed recognition of Klein's
important theoretical contributions in the areas of
7
splitting, projective identification and introjective
identification-
-particularly after Anna Freud failed to
mention any of these processes in The Ego and the Mechanisms
of Defence, originally published in 1936 (Freud, 1948)
.
Loyalty to Anna Freud, combined with abhorrence of some of
the more sensational (and often implausible) aspects of
Klein's theories, led many of Klein's critics to dismiss her
ideas outright (Jones, 1950)
.
Margaret Mahler, who like Klein worked primarily with
young children, also conceptualized early splitting as a
normal process, attributing adaptive, as well as defensive
functions to it. Her theory of the subphases of separation-
individuation stipulated a normal period of splitting in
which internal self and object representations are firmly
distinguished from one another (Mahler, Pine & Bergman,
1975) .
Ego psychology and the British object relations school
thus concluded that the most essential component of reality
testing- -the ability to distinguish internal from external
stimuli- -was itself a function of normal developmental
splitting (Blanck & Blanck, 1974)
.
Kernberg's elegant litmus test for distinguishing
character disorders, psychotic conditions, and neurotic
conditions is relevant here. Two key questions must be
answered. First, is the patient's reality testing intact?
Second, is the patient characteristically dependent upon
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"primitive" defenses such as splitting? (Kernberg, 1984,
1988) These questions address the degree to which the
patient's normal developmental splitting of childhood was
ultimately resolved. Did the patient retain the split
between self and object, and did the patient mend the
developmental split in self- and object-representations?
Borderline Splitting
In the borderline literature, "splitting" usually
refers to the phase- inappropriate and excessive use of
splitting defenses clinicians commonly see in adult
borderline patients. Kernberg (1975, p. 29) provided the
classic definition of intrapsychic splitting as the "active
process of keeping apart introj ections and identifications
of opposite quality" . Together, contradictory cognitions and
affects comprise the "opposite quality" of split
introjections and identifications.
Kernberg (1975) claimed that when splitting persists
too long in childhood, it short-circuits neutralization of
aggressive and libidinal drive, thereby depriving the ego of
the sort of moderated and focused energy needed for
continuing psychic development. Continually buffeted by
untempered drive derivatives (e.g., wishes, fantasies,
primitive impulses, etc.) associated with the split self-
and object-representations, the ego is unable to establish a
9
consistent frame of reference from which to mediate between
the immediate demands of drive and the ultimate constraints
of reality. Kernberg's "ego weakness" refers to the varied
impairments of ego function that ensue as developmental
failures cascade upon one another.
Discussing adult character disordered psychiatric
patients whose cognitive representations of self and objects
usually remain split. Kernberg (1975, p. 29) noted that:
The direct clinical manifestation of splitting may be
the alternate expression of complementary sides of a
conflict in certain character disorders, combined with
a bland denial and lack of concern over the
contradiction in his behavior and internal experience
by the patient... Probably the best known manifestation
of splitting is the division of external objects into
"all good" ones and "all bad" ones, with the
concomitant possibility of complete, abrupt shifts of
an object from one extreme compartment to the other;
that is, sudden and complete reversals of all feelings
and conceptualizations about a particular person.
Extreme and repetitive oscillation between
contradictory self concepts may also be the result of
the mechanism of splitting.
The rapidity and massiveness of the switches from one
split perspective to another is what makes borderline
patients so memorable to their therapists. Consider one of
Harold Searles' patients who told him "You deserve the
Congressional Medal of Spit." As Searles (1986, p. 501)
noted, "The first seven words of that eight-word sentence
conveyed heartfelt admiration; but the last one, said with
no break at all in the rhythm of her speech, was uttered in
unalloyed contempt .
"
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Unlike psychologically healthy adults, who may split
selectively, and even adaptively on occasion, severe
borderline splitting is essentially uncontrolled and
pervasive. Whereas a healthy person may split off relatively
small portions of self- and object -representations, the
borderline splits self- and object-representations into
wildly contrasting halves.
The problem with the borderline, in other words, is
structural. Severe borderlines do not, at a basic level,
have any conception of the self or objects as whole
entities, with both good and bad aspects. They sometimes
experience themselves as a "good self" and sometimes a "bad
self" . Likewise, they experience significant objects
sometimes as "all good", sometimes as "all bad."
As Kernberg (1975) noted, we rarely, if ever, see pure
splitting, even with severe borderline patients; instead,
this defense combines with infantile forms of idealization
and projection, projective identification, denial,
omnipotence and devaluation. Acting synergistically with one
another, such operations severely undermine cognitive
mediation of extreme affect and impulsivity, and make
realistic object relations impossible. The combination of
splitting and projective identification is especially
damaging to borderline patients because it tends to
reproduce, in the real relational world, the same chaos and
distortion characterizing internal object relations.
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In The Primitive Edge of Experience, Thomas Ogden spent
considerable time outlining the theoretically and
experiential ly amorphous boundary between what might be
considered purely intrapsychic splitting processes and their
inevitable interpersonal sequelae:
Splitting defensively renders object-related experience
of a given emotional valence (for example, the
relationship of a loving self to a loving object)
discontinuous from object -related experience of other
valences (for example, the relationship of a hating
self to a hating object)
. Each time a good object is
disappointing, it is no longer experienced as a good
object- not even as a disappointing good object- but as
the discovery of a bad object in what had been
masquerading as a good one. Instead of ambivalence
there is the experience of unmasking the truth. This
results in a continual rewriting of history such that
the present experience of the object is projected
backward and forward in time creating an eternal
present that has only a superficial resemblance to time
as experienced in a... Imore conventional! mode...
Rewriting of history leads to a brittleness and
instability of object relations that are in continual
states of reversal (Ogden, 1989, p. 19).
It takes little imagination to envision the
destructiveness of such a phenomenological position in the
interpersonal realm. In a study of severely ill borderline
patients Greene, Rosenkrantz and Muth (1986, p. 256) noted
that
:
By means of splitting operations, good and bad,
idealized and devalued, internal objects are forcefully
dissociated from each other; the borderline's
internalized social schemata are thought to consist of
rigidly dichotomized and polarized categories- pleasing
and need-satisfying versus threatening and need
thwarting - of interpersonal experience. To reinforce
these emotionally crude distinctions, loved and hated
internalized objects are continuously and massively
projected onto and into different segments of the
current social field... the borderline basically is not
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invested in the painstaking work of discovering the
reality of actual social objects; the paramount need is
to find external figures capable of being transformed
magically and immediately, via projective endowments,
into the good and bad, protective and haunting objects
of the borderline's internal world...
Viewing objects alternatively as all good or all bad,
and lacking more subtle cognitive schemata with which to
realistically appreciate actual objects, borderline patients
essentially try to make the world conform to their sense of
reality so as to maintain some sense of order,
predictability and meaning for themselves. Through such
unconscious mechanisms as projective identification,
borderline patients often manage to induce in real objects
the very affects, moods, impulses, fantasies, and other
cognitions unconsciously "disowned" through splitting
(Cashdan, 1988; Ogden, 1982, 1986, 1989; Scharff , 1992) . A
retraumatizing positive feedback loop results as the
borderline's unrealistic split self- and object -schemata,
and the behavior they give rise to, unwittingly induce
reactions in the interpersonal field which reinforce the
borderline's distorted view of that field.
One well known example of splitting acting in
conjunction with projective identification occurs in the
phenomenon referred to as "staff splitting" of inpatient
hospital staff by borderline patients. In "staff splitting"
a number of unit workers are unconsciously induced by the
borderline patient, through projective identification, to
act out certain split-off aspects of the borderline's ego.
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Some staff members, for example, may find themselves
experiencing the split-off rage of the patient, toward whom
they may assume a rather punitive position. Other staff
members, at the same time, may find themselves experiencing
an overwhelming need to protect and defend the patient.
Unless the situation is correctly diagnosed as a
manifestation of the patient's projective identifications,
the situation may easily escalate to the point at which
staff spend increasing amounts of time passionately
disagreeing about which treatment approach to follow. They
may even sabotage each other's work (Gabbard, 1989).
Detecting Splitting
Students of splitting have thusfar taken four general
approaches to the problem of detecting splitting- which like
many other intrapsychic processes can only be inferred on
the basis of observable behavior.
The first method, the clinical method, is the oldest of
the four approaches and the most crucial in
psychotherapeutic work. The clinical approach is exemplified
by the clinician who infers the operation of splitting after
observing rapid and dramatic shifts in a patient's expressed
attitude toward significant objects or the self (for
example, recall the quote from Searles' patient)
.
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An important advantage of the clinical method of
detecting splitting is that it allows the possibility of a
clinician becoming aware of splitting almost immediately,
thereby making timely intervention conceivable. Assuming
that the clinician has become well attuned to the various
nuances of the patient's dynamics and communications, the
clinical method may also achieve high reliability and
validity in particular clinical situations.
Unfortunately, reliaJDility cannot be assumed in every
case. There are at least three important problems. First,
there is the issue of calibration. What degree of change in
one's expressed attitudes toward self or others is required
before it is reasonable to infer a splitting operation? What
one clinician hears as a disjunctive shift in emotional tone
and attitude (suggestive of splitting) might be perceived by
another clinician as less disjunctive and more suggestive of
ambivalence
.
Second, verbally communicated manifestations of
splitting are probably influenced to some extent by such
things as the splitter's educational level and the degree to
which the splitter has been socialized to speak strong
thoughts directly, or to withhold them.
Finally, countertransference is notoriously powerful in
work with patients who split frequently. When splitting is
combined with projective identification and idealization or
devaluation of the therapist, the clinician's own
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narcissistic needs and vulnerabilities may be directly-
tapped. Sometimes, in such cases, splitting goes undiagnosed
while the clinician resonates uninsightfully with the
patient's distorted views of him or her.
In summary, the clinical method of detecting splitting,
dependent as it is on the training and experience of the
clinician, the quality of the relationship between the
patient and clinician, the vicissitudes of the clinician's
attention to the possibility of splitting, and many other
variable and essentially unquantif iable factors, must be
considered insufficiently rigorous for serious scientific
purposes
.
The second general method for measuring splitting
involves the use of self -administered scales, like that
developed by Gerson (1984) to identify people with a
characterlogical propensity for splitting, Gerson' s 14 item
scale (Table 1) , based on her survey of splitting literature
in ego psychology and self psychology, included items
designed to assess such things as separation of good and bad
images of self and other, anger, idealization, grandiosity,
and Kernberg's (1975) "identity diffusion", all
theoretically linked to splitting.
An interesting and iir^ortant aspect of Gerson 's scale
(or any self -administered defense scale) is that it requires
subjects to be aware of manifestations of what is largely an
unconscious defensive operation. Citing Kemberg (1975) and
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Kohut (1971), Gerson (1984, p. 158) addressed the issue
directly, stating that "self-report is an appropriate mode
of assessing the defense of splitting because the
manifestations of the defense, such as shifting object
evaluations, are part of awareness, although the purpose
served by the shifts is not."
Gerson (1984) carried out preliminary psychometric
assessment of the scale and found scale scores positively
associated with a scale measure of narcissistic personality
and negatively associated with a self-esteem measure.
Glassman (1986) performed additional psychometric work,
concluding that seven items were superfluous . Items retained
in the revised scale are flagged in Table 1.
The Gerson scale is not intended to detect particular
instances of splitting, but only to measure people's
proclivity for splitting. If found reliable and valid, such
a scale has importance in research as a tool with which to
discriminate frequent and infrequent splitters. This is how
it was used in the current study, and additional evidence
was produced supporting its validity in Study 2.
A third general approach to measuring splitting is
exemplified by the Lerner and Lerner (1982) Rorschach scale.
Believing that the natural ambiguity of the blots would
elicit characteristic defensive reactions in susceptible
subjects, the Lerners thought that splitting would manifest
in several ways. For example, in a Rorschach response
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Table 1. Gerson's (1984) splitting scale.
(Not at all true) 12 3 4 5 6 7 (Very True)
1. ) I hate to hear someone close to me being criticized.
2. ) When I'm with someone really terrific, I feel dumb."
3. ) When I'm angry, everyone around me seems rotten."
4. ) My friends don't know how much I'd like to be admired by
people
.
5. ) It's hard for me to get angry at people I like.
6. ) It's very painful when someone disappoints me.'
7
. ) I have absolutely no sympathy for people who abuse their
children
.
8. ) Sometimes I feel I could do anything in the world.
9. ) There are times my wife (husband) /girlfriend (boyfriend)
seems as strong as iron, and at other times as
helpless as a baby.
10. ) I often feel that I can't put the different parts of my
personality together, so that there is one me."
11. ) I sometimes feel my love is dangerous.
*
12. ) When I'm in a new situation, there's often one person I
really dislike."
13. ) It's hard for me to become sexually excited when I'm
depressed ."
14. ) Some people have too much power over me."
"Item retained in Classman's (1986) revised scale.
"an implicitly idealized figure" could be "tarnished or
spoiled by the addition of one or more features or an
implicitly devalued figure" could be "enhanced by the
addition of one or more features..." Alternatively, a
response might involve "two clearly distinguished figures"
with "each figure... described in a way opposite to the
other: 'two figures, a man and a woman. He is mean and
shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there
and taking it.'" (Lerner & Lerner, 1982, pp. 85-86).
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administering a Rorschach correctly and reliably requires
considerable training and practice. Second, the
administration itself can be fairly time consuming, and is
usually done with one subject at a time. Third, reliable
scoring of a Rorschach protocol using the defense scales
requires additional training and practice. These factors
alone make the use of the Rorschach impractical for most
research purposes
.
There is also one important theoretical problem in
using any projective measure. In the words of Rapaport,
Gill, & Schafer (1975, p. 224), the projective hypothesis,
upon which all projective interpretation is ultimately
based, is essentially the idea that "manifestations of the
human being's behavior, from the least to the most
significant ones, are revealing of his personality." The
validity of this hypothesis is far from universally
accepted. Thus, studies relying too heavily upon Rorschach
measures, or other projective test data, suffer a loss of
credibility among many scientifically oriented
psychologists
.
Greene, Rosenkrantz and Muth (1985) exemplify a fourth
means of measuring splitting, focusing more on interpersonal
than intrapsychic splitting. Here, evidence of interpersonal
splitting is used to infer intrapsychic splitting. The
researchers asked members of a borderline therapy group to
judge themselves on the dimension of goodness/badness in
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relation to other group members, and then asked them to
evaluate the group coleaders
.
The key finding was that the more a patient rated
him/herself as bad in relation to the rest of the group the
greater was the tendency to rate the cotherapists
differentially on a number of personal dimensions. This
suggests that the more extreme the view of the self on the
good/bad dimension, vis a vis other people with whom one is
interacting, the more likely it is that one will use also
evaluate others more extremely on salient dimensions.
Interestingly, Morrison, Greene, & Tischler (1985)
demonstrated that mental health professionals in Tavistock
group training show the same tendency to evaluate group
leaders differentially. The Tavistock results can be
interpreted as reflecting interpersonal and intrapsychic
splitting, only if one makes the additional assumption that
the (presumably) mentally healthy mental health workers
split defensively, in response to the extraordinary stress
of the Tavistock process (Bion,1959), rather than for deeper
structural reasons. That is, they regressed to splitting
under the pressure of group processes, rather than splitting
being a common feature of their psychic life.
This assumption is not implausible, but does suggest
the importance of distinguishing evidence of splitting in
discrete circumstances and evidence of splitting in a
broader context due to characterlogical issues.
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Self -Schemata
Although not typically interested in splitting, per se,
social psychologists have long studied the development,
maintenance, and implications of strongly held views of the
self and others. In her landmark study of self -schemata
Hazel Markus (1977, p. 63) noted that:
The quantity and variety of social stimulation
available at any time is vastly greater than a person
can process or even attend to. Therefore, individuals
are necessarily selective in what they notice, learn,
remember, or infer in any situation. These selective
tendencies, of course, are not random but depend on
some internal cognitive structures which allow the
individual to process the incoming information with
some degree of efficiency. Recently, these structures
for encoding and representing information have been
called. . . schemata. . .The influence of cognitive
structures on the selection and organization of
information is probably most apparent when we process
information about ourselves. A substantial amount of
information processed by an individual (some might even
argue a majority of information) is information about
the self, and a variety of cognitive structures are
necessarily involved in processing this information. .
.
It is proposed here that attempts to organize,
summarize, or explain one's own behavior in a
particular domain will result in the formation of
cognitive structures about the self or what might be
called self -schemata. Self schemata are cognitive
generalizations about the self, derived from past
experience, that organize and guide the processing of
self-related information contained in the individual's
social experiences
.
From this view self -schemata play a fundamental role in
shaping one's constantly evolving sense of reality as it
relates to the self, by influencing what one attends to,
what one encodes in memory, and the inferences drawn from
environmental events (Markus & Nurius, 1986)
.
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To test her ideas, Markus (1977) asked subjects to rate
how dependent they were. She defined subjects who rated
themselves extremely dependent, or extremely independent as
schematic on the dependent/independent dimension, and others
who rated themselves more moderately as aschematic.
She then demonstrated, among other things, that being
schematic (at either extreme) significantly increased the
efficiency with which judgments about the self on the
schematic dimension were made. She concluded that people can
make much more confident judgments about the self, more
rapidly, when queried about schematic dimensions, rather
than dimensions which are, for them, aschematic,
Markus' conclusions about the information processing
advantages of self -schema use have generally been supported
by other research. Most notable, perhaps, is the work of
Kuiper (1981) , who had subjects rate how much each of a
series of adjectives did or did not describe the self, on a
9-point scale'. Later, subjects were asked to make a
dichotomous judgment whether each adjective was like or
unlike them, and response time was recorded. The essential
finding was that response latencies were considerably
shorter for adjectives rated extremely on the 9-point scale,
that is, as very much like the self or unlike the self. The
same pattern, which Kuiper graphically referred to as the
' Kuiper treats self as a prototype, rather than a
schema, a technical difference of importance for some
purposes, but not here.
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"inverted-U RT effect", held when subjects were asked to
judge another person according to the same adjectives.
Two important conclusions follow. First, people find
it easiest to recognize near-perfect (and thus obvious)
matches between the self -concept and adjectives used to
describe it, or extremely bad (and likewise obvious)
mismatches, but require more information processing effort
in judging cases that fall between the extremes. Second,
people most efficiently judge others on dimensions most
salient to their own sense of self.
What is important is self -concept , not the "objective
self". Self -schemata are not necessarily accurate
representations of the self; they do not need to be in order
to have significant information processing effects. That is,
people process information about the self based on whatever
self -representations are dominant, and these may or may not
bear a lot of resemblance to more objective representations
of self.
This simplifies the problem of determining how
schematic people are on given dimensions. We do not need to
measure how dependent a person really is to judge his or her
schematicism on the independence/dependence dimension.
Rather, as noted by Fiske and Taylor (1991, pp. 183-184), we
only need to ask him or her:
There are several criteria for deciding if someone has
a schema (is schematic) or has no schema (is
aschematic) on a particular dimension of his or her
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self concept. People are self
-schematic on dimensions
that are important to them, on which they think of
themselves as extreme, and on which they are certain
the opposite does not hold... Thus, if independence is
important to you, and if you think of yourself as
extremely independent and as not at all dependent, that
implies that you have accumulated considerable
knowledge about yourself on that dimension. For
example, you should be certain that you would never ask
for help setting up your stereo, even at the potential
cost of damage to it or harm to yourself... In contrast
to schematics, aschematics are not invested in, or
concerned about a particular attribute. They rate the
trait as low to moderately self-descriptive, and
perceive it as low to moderate in importance. Of
course, people who are aschematic on one trait may well
be schematic on others; everyone has some dimensions of
self that are idiosyncratically salient.
The second experiment of the present research uses the
three criteria mentioned by Fiske and Taylor for determining
the degree to which subjects are schematic on a variety of
dimensions. The first two criteria, the degree to which
subjects rate themselves extreme on a dimension and the
degree to which they find that dimension personally
significant, logically apply equally well to frequent and
infrequent splitters.
However, even though the third criterion (disavowal of
the opposite trait) seems eminently appropriate in judging
garden variety schematicism, its applicability in evaluating
schematicism of split dimensions requires some discussion.
Although the classic sort of self -schema described by
Fiske and Taylor is unipolar, self-concept in borderline
splitting is bipolar. That is, in the case of a classic
self-schema a person endorses one extreme end of a self-
dimension, and never endorses the opposite extreme. In
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characterlogical splitting, on the other hand, both extremes
are endorsed, though not at the same time.
It has long been noted by clinicians, however, that
borderline patients are quite capable of acknowledging
aspects of self opposed to the currently activated side of a
split, when confronted, but give the opposing aspects no
emotional, and thus no practical weight (Kernberg, 1975;
Masterson, 1976) .
Because splitting does not make aspects of self opposed
to the currently activated side of the split entirely
unconscious (Masterson, 1976) , the decision to apply the
third Fiske and Taylor (1991) criterion hinged on the
following logic: admission of the inactivated side of a
split, which generally occurs in response to confrontation
in clinical situations, represents at least a partial
failure of the splitting defense. The purest cases of
splitting should involve denial, to a considerable degree,
of the inactivated side of the split.
Thus, by including the third criterion in my
measurement of schematicism on dimensions reputed to be
important among frequent splitters (borderlines being the
most frequent splitters) , I hoped to detect the most robust
instances of splitting. As described in chapter 2 and
chapter 3, the questions subjects answered to yield my
overall measure of schematicism were posed prior to other
experimental manipulations or challenges. I used this
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procedure to maximize the chance that measured schematicism
on global dimensions signified by such words as good, bad,
loving, and hateful would reflect characterlogical
splitting, rather than atypical splitting resulting from
unusual stress caused by the experimental procedures
themselves
.
It should be re-emphasized, however, that denial that
the opposite ever holds is not necessarily a stable feature
of schematicism in borderline splitting. This means that the
concept of schematicism, as formally defined by Fiske and
Taylor (1991)
,
may only apply within certain parameters in
the case of borderline subjects.
Complexity of Self -Representations
The Fiske and Taylor (1991) quotation implies that
self -schemata apply to somewhat limited dimensions of self.
As a corollary, one can infer that a person can be schematic
on several relatively independent dimensions. For example,
it is possible to be a schematic sports fan, a schematic
Democrat, and a schematic gourmet, with each schema
remaining fairly independent of the others.
In order to conceptualize borderline splitting in terms
of self -schemata, however, one must imagine that the
dichotomous self -schemata are a great deal more global. That
is, rather than having the normal complement of reasonably
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independent self
-schemata associated with circumscribed
dimensions of self, the borderline is conceptualized as
having two alternatively activated, self
-schemata, both of
which are relatively all
-encompassing.
By all -encompassing I mean that the good and bad self-
schemata of the borderline subsume most other aspects of
self. This implies that they are also salient in most life
situations. Although a great many life events have no
relevance to a Democrat self-schema, or a sports fan self-
schema, almost any life event has potential relevance to a
hypothetical good self -schema or bad self -schema.
Linville (1985, p. 95) described people as having
complex representations of self or others when they organize
self-knowledge "in terms of a greater number of aspects that
are relatively independent of one another." She then
demonstrated that complexity of self- or other-
representation is associated with less extreme evaluations
of self and others, and less affective extremity. In her
view more complex representations serve to buffer
evaluations and affect by providing a framework for
integrating discrepant bits of information about self or
others (Linville, 1982, 1985, 1987).
The borderline good self- and bad self -schemata must be
considered simple representations in Linville 's sense,
because they involve two global evaluations, with but one
active at any given time. To the extent they subsume any
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less global aspects of self, the more circumscribed aspects
of self-representation are, by definition, highly correlated
under the good or bad rubrics. According to Linville's
theory, the simple self
-representations we see with
borderlines should result in extreme evaluations of the self
as well as extreme affect associated with such appraisal.
Affect and Self - Schemata
The literature dealing with depressive self
-schemata
(e.g., Beck, 1979; Kuiper et al
. ,
1985) exemplifies a
broader effort to understand emotions from a cognitive
perspective. From this perspective the affect elicited by an
event depends as much upon personal "meaning-making" as the
event's objective aspects.
Beck's (1979, p. 84) "cognitive triad" of depression,
which he implicates in the development of most depressive
disorders, includes "a negative conception of the self, a
negative interpretation of life experiences, and a
nihilistic view of the future." The cognitive triad is
pertinent to the present study because the "negative
conception of the self" is essentially a self-schema which
is associated quite closely, in Beck's view, with a
particular affective experience.
Fiske (1982) empirically demonstrated the close linkage
of affect and certain schemata by showing that when a schema
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is activated, the affect associated with it is also
triggered. One must be careful not to assume that the
opposite necessarily holds, however. In the normal situation
a particular affect could be associated with any number of
schemata, and one couldn't reasonably expect affect to
trigger a particular schema just because the schema
triggered the affect. What works in one direction may not
work in reverse
.
The situation in borderline splitting is hardly normal,
however. Here the world and the self are split into two
overarching categories- -good and bad. Given this, it is not
unreasonable to expect euthymic mood (i.e., positive or
"good" mood) to trigger the good schema, and dysthymic mood
the bad schema. If, as Linville (1987) noted, the less
complex a person's sense of self, the larger the proportion
of self-aspects likely to be affected by an emotionally
salient event, a borderline's simple sense of self should be
massively affected by any induced mood change.
This fits current wisdom regarding borderline patients.
After noting that borderline individuals are subject to
emotional dysregulation, characterized by a low threshold
for emotional reaction, intense emotional reaction once the
threshold is passed, and a slower than normal return to
emotional baseline, Linehan (1993) emphasized that strong
emotion narrows attention to mood- congruent information, so
that cognitions tend to fall into line with strong affect.
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This suggests that once strong affect is triggered i
borderline, splitting is liable to occur; the good self o
the bad self is elicited or reinforced. Whether the split
will necessarily be mood congruent, or defensively mood
incongruent (with the mood congruent side of the split
perhaps projected onto an object) is not so certain,
however
.
Splitting and Self -Schemata
The present research grew out of the idea that
splitting can be understood as a process in which opposing
self -schemata are alternatively activated. A related premise
holds that any splitting (even if it is not of the
alternating borderline variety) involves activation of a
self -schema
.
In social cognition an active self -schema is believed
to manifest in both the willful (i.e., conscious) and
automatic (i.e., unconscious) behavior of a person. In the
willful realm, as noted above, a person acting schematically
will overtly identify him or herself as extreme on schematic
dimensions, will assert the personal importance of this
identification, and will also assert that an opposite
identification does not hold true.
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Two methods were employed in the two studies described
below to tap the conscious side of self -schematicism. First,
subjects were asked to locate themselves on scales
representing a trait of interest. This provides a measure of
a subject's extremity of self -concept on that trait
dimension. Second, subjects were asked to judge, as rapidly
as possible, whether trait adjectives presented on a
computer monitor were best characterized as me or not me.
A person should also show automatic (unconscious)
improvement in ability to process schema- related information
in comparison with aschematic information. In the second
experiment of the present study subjects were asked to
"guess" whether subliminally presented trait adjectives did
or did not describe them. Because they remained consciously
unaware of the words presented, significant variance from a
random response pattern on particular terms provided one
measure of automatic improvement in information processing,
in this case manifesting as an improved ability to "guess"
consistently, presumably in congruence with an underlying
schema which had primed them to respond nonrandomly.
Lowered response latency in me /not me judgments about
adjectives presented on either subliminal tasks or
superliminal tasks was treated as another potential
indicator of improved information processing.
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Summary
In this chapter I outlined the historical development
of the concept of splitting in the psychoanalytic tradition,
and distinguished between normal developmental splitting and
borderline splitting. I then described several general
methods which have been used to detect splitting for
clinical or research purposes.
Next I discussed the concept of self -schemata from the
social cognitive school, with emphasis on improvements in
information processing associated with the use of self-
schemata. Finally, I speculated that splitting can be
usefully described in terms of extreme, global, and
alternating self -schemata
.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY ONE
In the fall of 1993 I conducted pilot research intended
to accomplish two primary goals: 1) to explore the use of
mood inductions as a means of inducing splitting, and 2) to
consider the usefulness of inconsistencies in self-
evaluation, under contrasting moods, as a marker of
splitting
.
In this chapter I describe the experiment in detail,
present and analyze the results, and discuss changes in
experimental design prompted by the mixed results
.
General Hypotheses
Assuming that splitting could be provoked in
susceptible subjects using the mood induction procedure
described by Parrott (1991), described in detail below, I
expected the splitting to manifest as inconsistency in
judgments about the self -descriptiveness of adjectives after
subjects experienced contrasting mood inductions. The
general logic is simple: if splitting involves a switch from
one self -schema to another then judgments about the self-
descriptiveness of trait terms central to those self-
schemata should vary as the schemata alternate.
34
Because frequent splitters (as determined by the Gerson
Splitting Scale) were expected by definition to split more
than infrequent splitters during the experiment, as a result
of contrasting mood inductions, I also predicted that
frequent splitters would show more inconsistency than those
identified as infrequent splitters.
Another major hypothesis was that subjects identified
as frequent splitters would rate the self -descriptiveness of
trait adjectives in a more extreme fashion than subjects
identified by their Gerson scale scores as infrequent
splitters. I based this hv'pothesis on the supposition that
people who split characterologically (and thus with greatest
frequency) have simple bipolar self -representations and
consequently evaluate self and others in a more extreme way.
Note that extremity of self-rating is not necessarily
indicative of schematicism on a trait, because the rating
may reflect the view that one is entirely unlike a trait.
Henceforth I will use the term schematic to refer to
situations in which a trait is strongly endorsed as self-
descriptive, the term antischewatic to refer to situations
in which a trait is strongly denied to be self-descriptive,
and the term aschematic in situations in which a trait is
neither strongly endorsed as self-descriptive nor denied as
self-descriptive
.
Finally, I hypothesized that frequent splitters would
tend to respond more rapidly than infrequent splitters, whei
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asked to judge the self -descriptiveness of the terms good
and bad, on the theory that these terms tap the extreme,
contradictory self -schemata which should be more
characteristic of frequent than infrequent splitters.
Methods
In this section I describe the experimental procedures
in detail
.
Sampling
Study 1 and Study 2 were labor intensive, requiring my
assistants and I to spend about an hour with each subject.
Thus, I found it necessary to limit the experimental sample
to the smallest size offering reasonable statistical power.
Because frequent splitting is an uncommon characteristic in
the general population, however, a small random sample would
have yielded few, if any, frequent splitters. Thus, I
employed disproportional stratified sampling to yield two
subsamples with extreme scores on the splitting scale.
Thanks to a prescreening process psychology majors are
required to undergo, we were able to administer the revised
Gerson scale (Glassman, 1986) to more than 1,000
undergraduates
.
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Prescreening data were written to an SPSS file on the
University's mainframe computer. I sorted and stratified
these student records by Gerson scale score, and combined
the highest strata with the lowest, the next highest with
the next lowest, and so on. In this way I generated new
strata of scores ranging from most extreme (high and low) to
most moderate. I retained only the most extreme strata for
further use, randomizing records within strata.
I produced a list of student names and phone numbers,
with no indication of Gerson scale score (other than degree
of extremity) . My assistants and I called students in the
order they were listed, and asked them to participate in an
experiment^ . The only substantive information we provided
about the experiment was that it involved putting oneself in
the mood suggested by certain pieces of music. More than
fifty students agreed to participate but only 39 ultimately
participated (19 frequent splitters and 20 infrequent
splitters) . The rest failed to show up as scheduled.
Study Procedures
A researcher met with individual subjects for
approximately an hour in a small quiet, windowless
' A separate list of all potential subjects, sorted by
phone number, was maintained, checked regularly throughout
the sampling process to insure that roommates were not
sampled. This was a precaution against subjects hearing
about the experimental design before coming m.
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experimental room in Tobin Hall, at the University of
Massachusetts. The room was furnished with two chairs and a
desk. Items on the desk included a computer monitor and
keyboard hooked up to an IBM type PC, a cassette tape deck,
and a pair of stereo headphones capable of playing
prerecorded cassette tapes with a high degree of fidelity.
We asked subjects to read and sign an informed consent
form which explained, among other things, that there was
some small risk they might experience unforeseen effects as
a result of the mood induction procedure. All subjects
signed the release. We then oriented them to the equipment
on the desk.
In particular, we directed their attention to a cover
which fit over the keyboard in such a way that only two
groups of function keys and another set of keys labelled
with the digits from 1 to 9 were accessible. The first group
of function keys, comprised of four horizontally aligned
keys, was labelled not me on the keyboard cover. A second
group of four horizontally aligned function keys, located
five inches to the right of the first group, was labelled
me
.
Thus, we explained, subjects would be able to respond
me by pressing any one of the four keys so labelled, or not
me by pressing any one of the other four accessible keys.
We started the computer program and it prompted
subjects to indicate the degree to which various adjectives
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did or did not describe them, using the digit keys from 1 to
9 (with 1 indicating complete rejection of the adjective as
self-descriptive and 9 representing complete endorsement of
the adjective). Gough's (1952) Adjective Check provided 14
of the 36 adjectives used in this study, with others
suggested by friends and colleagues who helped test the
computer program (Table 2)
.
Table 2. Adjectives used in Study one.
Ambitious" Happy Sinful*
Assertive* Humble Smart
Athletic Impulsive* Stable*
Attractive* Insecure Stupid
Bad Intellectual Thin
Believable Kind* Timid*
Careful Liberal Ugly
Clumsy Moral Unworthy
Confident* Nervous* Wanted
Emotional* Rational* Weak*
Generous* Right Well -liked
Good Sad Wrong
"Derived from Gough (1952) .
It should be emphasized that this was a rather
primitive measure of schematicism, incorporating only the
first of the three Fiske and Taylor (1991) criteria for
determining whether a person is schematic on a given
dimension.
During a pause in the computer program, we asked
subjects to listen carefully to a musical selection, and to
put themselves in the mood suggested by the music. All
subjects heard Delibes' Mazurka from Copp^lia, at this time
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(Delibes et al
. ,
1989). This music, lasting approximately
four and a half minutes, was intended to induce happy mood.
Musical mood induction is one of several approaches
taken in recent research to alter the mood of experimental
subjects (Clark, 1983; Kenneally, 1988) . Parrott (1991)
specifically validated Delibes' piece for happy mood
induction and Prokofiev's stark Russia under the Yoke of the
Monguls, from the soundtrack of Eisenstein's Alexander
Nevsky, for sad mood induction (Prokofiev et al
. ,
1987).
The computer program was restarted and subjects were
then instructed to judge, as rapidly as possible, whether
the adjectives they would soon see on the screen did or did
not describe them, and to respond either me or not me by
pressing an appropriate key. The computer displayed the
adjectives against a black screen in white letters 1.3 cm
high, from a distance of approximately 61 cm. Adjectives
were presented in unique random order for each subject, one
at a time, for a maximum of 6 seconds. After 6 seconds the
computer scored the response missing and cycled to the next
adjective. The computer automatically recorded response
latency and direction of successful responses.
Next, on the basis of random assignment unknown to the
experimenter until that moment, subjects listened to a
repeat of the Delibes piece or, if the subject was assigned
to the experimental, contrasting mood induction condition,
to Prokofiev's Russia, under the Yoke of the Monguls.
40
The latter piece was not played as half speed, as
Parrott (1991) presented it to his subjects, because this
would have extended its normal three and three quarters
minutes length to seven and a half minutes, exceeding the
time which could be allotted for mood induction. Even at
regular speed the music is grimly evocative, as aptly
described by music reviewer Steven Ledbetter (1987, p.3)
:
The film opens on a scene of desolate empty steppes
littered with signs of past battle. Prokofiev's musical
equivalent of this desolation is a keening melody
played in unison, four octaves apart, with noting but
emptiness in between. The oboes' lamenting tune suggest
poignant loss, while the rapid turn figure in the muted
violas and violins is an image of the feather-grass
blowing on the hillside- -the only thing moving.
Following the second mood induction, subjects repeated
the adjective task, with adjectives presented in a new
random order. Again, the computer recorded direction of
response and response latency. After this we administered
the happy mood induction to subjects who had received the
sad mood induction. We debriefed all subjects fully, paying
special attention to any emotional changes the subjects
reported (Appendices B and C) . We then dismissed subjects •
fipg^cific Hypotheses
Specific hypotheses tested in this study are listed
below, their rationale having already been discussed.
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Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean consistency rate of
me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects with high
Gerson scale scores than subjects with low Gerson scale
scores
.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that the mean consistency rate of
me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects in the
experimental condition than subjects in the control
condition
.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b
Hypothesis 3a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low
Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the 9 -point scale
on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term good.
Hypothesis 3b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low
Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the 9 -point scale
on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term bad.
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b
Hypothesis 4a predicts subjects with high Gerson scale
scores will respond quicker in making judgments about the
trait adjective good than subjects with low Gerson scores.
Hypothesis 4b predicts subjects with high Gerson scale
scores will respond quicker in making judgments about the
trait adjective good than subjects with low Gerson scores.
Results
This section presents experimental results pertinent to
the hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean consistency rate of
me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects with high
Gerson scale scores than subjects with low scale scores.
The 39 subjects produced 1342 usable pairs of matched
adjective responses, one response to the adjective following
the first mood induction, and one following the second mood
induction (an additional 62 pairs of responses were spoiled
by nonresponse to the adjective on one or both trials) . We
scored these pairs as consistent if both responses were
identical, or inconsistent if there was a change from Trial
1 to Trial 2
.
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Figure 1 compares the mean consistency rate of me/not
me judgments by subjects with low Gerson scores and subjects
with high Gerson scores. This difference of means is in the
direction predicted by hypothesis 1. The differences are not
statistically significant, however (t(22.1)=
-1.055, p=.l5),
and the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected.
In examining the data, I discovered that some
response times for me/not me judgments were so short (e.g.,
one was only 2 ms ! ) that they called into question the
legitimacy of the consistency score for that item. Removing
items from analysis if subjects responded in less than 100
ms yielded a mean consistency rate of .93 for infrequent
splitters and .86 for frequent splitters, a difference
closely approaching significance {t(25.3)= -1.565, p=.065).
Hypothesis 2 states that the mean consistency rate of
me/not me judgments will be higher for subjects in the
experimental condition than subjects in the control
condition.
Figure 2 compares the mean consistency rate of me/not
me judgments of subjects in the control condition versus
those in the experimental condition. The difference of means
is in the direction predicted in hypothesis 2, but the
results are not statistically significant ( t (23 . 1) = . 831,
p=.20) . Taking out of analysis responses of less than 100 ms
did not appreciably alter observed mean differences or their
statistical significance.
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Figure 3 depicts the combined effects of propensity for
splitting and experimental condition on the consistency rate
of me/not me judgments. Despite the fact that the trend
appears precisely that predicted by Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2, none of four means differ to a statistically
significant degree when contrasted in pairs.
It may seem surprising that having observed an almost
statistically significant difference between the consistency
rates of frequent and infrequent splitters, we would fail to
approach significance when contrasting the most different
mean consistency rates of subgroups of the frequent and
infrequent splitters. The explanation is simple: as the size
of contrasted groups declines so does the power of the t-
test as an inferential tool . An observed difference of means
which approaches significance when N=29 is liable to be far
from significant when N is only half that large.
In retrospect, the experimental arrangement, and the
nature of the data, did not permit sufficiently powerful
statistical testing; one would normally expect mean
differences of the magnitude observed above to achieve
statistical significance. Although 39 subjects would be
sufficient for many research designs, the large variance of
many variables in the present data set, and the allotment of
subjects to four distinct groups, combine to reduce power of
the statistical procedures available here.
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I expected consistency rates to vary according to the
degree to which a trait adjective was rated as like or
unlike the self. As Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6
illustrate, observed consistency was lower for all subgroups
in the case of traits rated moderately, rather than
extremely. This is what prior schema research would predict;
the more schematic or ant ischematic a dimension, the more
consistent one's judgments on that dimension should be.
Table 3 presents the mean consistency rates of me/not
me judgments of trait adjectives by the four experimental
groups for adjectives originally rated antischematically
unlike the self (ratings of 1-3), schematically like the
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self (ratings of 7-9)
, or aschematically (ratings of 4-6)
.
In addition to reflecting a tendency for lowest consistency
to occur in judgments of aschematic traits, the table shows
that the range of the means differed most for adjectives
rated aschematically or schematically.
However t-tests failed to find any of the group
means significantly different from any other. In addition to
the problem of relatively small N, noted above, the power of
the t-test suffers in a case like this by the loss of
variance information which occurs when a summary dependent
variable is constructed from other variables in the raw
data, especially when the latter represent repeated
measures. In this study subjects made two me/not me
judgments about each trait adjective and the consistency
rate refers only to the average congruence of judgments
involving all 36 trait adjective stimuli.
Some of the stimuli are of more theoretical interest
than others, given the earlier discussions of borderline
splitting and the tendency for borderlines to form good and
bad self -schemata. Wondering if important intergroup
differences in the consistency of responses to the terms
good and bad were being swamped by variance in the overall
consistency rate attributable to other terms, I examined the
good and bad responses in isolation. It turns out that
subjects with low Gerson scale scores were perfectly
consistent in their responses to the terms good and bad.
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However, the consistency rates for the frequent splitting
subjects, in the control and experimental conditions, were
.84 and .83, respectively.
It was obvious from mere observation of the group
means that the experimental condition could not have had
much impact on consistency, because both the infrequent
splitting subgroups had identical mean consistency rates and
the two frequent splitting subgroups had means that were
very close.
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
CO
oc
>»
o
c
«
CO
'« 0.75
o
o 0.70
0.65
1 1 1
f
/ \ \ /
/ \
* / /
\ ,/ /
-
\ /
1 1 1 ' ' 1 1
1.2.3. 4.5.6.7.8. 9,
Adjective Rating
Figure 6. Mean consistency
rate of me/not me judgments
for infrequent splitters by
trait ratings. (Solid line is
for experimental condition,
dashed line for control
condition
.
)
50
Table 3
.
Mean consistency rate of me/not me judgments
for the four experimental groups, by degree to which a trait
adjective was originally rated as like the self.
Groups
Largest
Adjective Rating LSD LSE HSC HSE Difference
Schematically Unlike the .94 .95 .94 .88 .07
Self (1-3)
Aschematically (4-6) .89 .79 .82 .78 .11
Schematically Like the .99 .97 .94 .87 .12
Self
Due to the lack of variance in two of the four subject
groups I could not perform an Analysis of Variance CANOVA)
.
Therefore, I used linear regression to test the effect of
propensity for splitting on the consistency rate for the
terms good and bad. In a regression equation (as opposed to
an ANOVA equation) it made sense to use the actual Gerson
scale score as the independent variable, rather than the
less informative dichotomous variable for designating the
Gerson score as high or low. The results of the regression
are presented in Table 4."
These results provide some support for a restricted
version of hypothesis 1, suggesting that high Gerson scorers
* A t-test was conducted to test the hypothesis that fi
is different for low Gerson scorers and high Gerson
scorers,
producing similar results: t(18)= -2.0497, p«.025.
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Table 4. Results of regression of consistency of me/not mejudgments for the words good and bad on Gerson splitting
scale score.
One
Tail
Variable B SE Beta T p
Constant .97 .043 .000 22.804 .000
Gerson Score
-.003 .001 -.326
-2.101 .021
N=39 R=.39 J?'=.107
tend to be somewhat more likely than low scorers to respond
inconsistently to the global traits good and bad.
In view of the fact that the of .107 is not
especially large, two observations are important. First, the
sample for this study represents a nonclinical population.
The prediction of greater inconsistency of me/not me
judgments involving the good and bad terms was derived,
essentially, from the borderline literature. Thus, there is
reason to expect one would achieve a higher and lower p
if the regression was performed using a clinical subsample.
Second, high and low Gerson scorers differ
significantly in consistency rates of me/not me judgments of
the terms good and bad but the difference in consistency
rate for all trait terms is not significant. This provides
additional evidence that although the inconsistencies in
good and bad responses were few in number, they were
meaningful, and not simply due to random error.
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Hypotheses 3a and ?>h
Hypothesis 3a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low
Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the 9 -point scale
on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term good.
Hypothesis 3b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will deviate further than subjects with low
Gerson scores from the midpoint value on the 9 -point scale
on which they are asked to rate the self -descriptiveness of
the trait term bad.
To test these hypotheses I measured subjects' deviation
from the midpoint of the 9 -point rating scale on which they
indicated the degree to which they saw themselves as like or
unlike a trait. An overall deviation score (D) was
calculated simply as: D= L |x-5|, where x equals the rating
a subject gave a particular trait adjective.
Because D measures deviation from the midpoint in a
linear manner, three instances in which a subject deviates
by one from the midpoint contribute as much to D as a single
response deviating by three points. Thus, D does not
necessarily capture occasional deviation of large magnitude.
To accentuate the most schematic responses, I constructed
another measure: = L {x-5)^ with the subscripted s in
referring to the squaring of differences.
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The direction of results, as reported in Table 5,
opposes the predictions of Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b.
Subjects with low Gerson scores had higher D and scores
than those with high Gerson scores (values for t and two
tailed p are included for reference only)
.
Table 5 has several interesting features. First, note
that the magnitude of mean difference for D^, under all
trait adjectives, is sufficiently large that if I had
correctly predicted the direction of the difference it would
be statistically significant under the single tailed
criterion (p would then equal .041 instead of .082) . The
same is almost true for D, where p would equal .055 under
single tailed criterion, assuming the differences were in
the predicted direction. Thus, the results suggest that low
Gerson scorers actually rate themselves as more like or more
unlike many diverse trait adjectives than high Gerson
scorers
.
Hypotheses 4a and 4b
Hypothesis 4a states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will respond more rapidly in making judgments
about the trait adjective grood than subjects with low Gerson
scores
.
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Table 5. Mean values of D and for the low and high Gerson
scale score groups.
Group
Good and Bad
D
All Trait Adjectives
Low Gerson
Scores
High Gerson
Scores
2 . 605
2 .263
8 . 026
6 .263
2 . 151
1 . 943
6 .239
5 .239
tj, = 1.146 t,, = 1.256
p=.259 p=.217
tj, = 1.636 t,, = 1.788
p=.110 p=.082
Hypothesis 4b states that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores will respond more rapidly in making judgments
about the trait adjective bad than subjects with low Gerson
scores
.
The test of hypotheses 4a and 4b involved comparison of
three measures: 1) the response latency for rating the trait
terms on a nine point scale, 2) the response latency for
trait terms during the first set of me/not me judgments, and
3) response latencies for the third set of me/not me
judgments. Results are presented in Table 6.
Contrary to hypotheses 4a and 4b, the mean reaction
time of high Gerson scorers exceeded that of low Gerson
scorers in every instance, although never to a statistically
significant degree.
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Note that both high and low Gerson scorers tended to
respond more rapidly to the words good and bad than other
trait adjectives, and that high Gerson scorers tended to
respond more slowly in all tests than low Gerson scorers.
Given these facts, it made sense to test the possibility
that high Gerson scorers responded more rapidly to the words
good and bad, in comparison to the baseline provided by all
Table 6. Mean reaction times (ms) to the words good and bad,
and all trait adjectives, on various rating and judgment
tasks
.
Variable
Low Gerson
Scores
High Gerson
Scores
Nine Point Rating
of all Trait
Adjectives
2590 3186
Nine Point Rating
of good and
bad
2491 3052
First Me/Not Me
Judgment of all
Trait Adjectives
1022 1086
First Me/Not Me
Judgment of good
and bad
850 988
Second Me/Not Me
Judgment of all
Trait Adjectives
938 1042
Second Me/Not Me
Judgment of good
and bad
843 972
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Table 7. Ratios formed by dividing the mean reaction times
for the terms good and bad by the mean reaction times for
all other trait adjectives.
Low Gerson High Gerson
Task Scorers Scorers
Nine Point .961 .958
Rating
First Me/Not Me .832 .910
Judgment
Second Me/Not Me .899 .933
Judgment
other trait adjectives, than low Gerson scorers. Table 7
provides the observed ratios of average reaction time for
the words good and bad in comparison to reaction times for
other adjectives.
None of the differences in reaction ratios are
statistically significant, or approach significance, and in
two of the three cases high Gerson scorers in this study had
a higher observed ratio than low Gerson scorers. This
unexpected result could be due to the previously noted fact
that high Gerson scorers in my sample rated the words good
and bad less extremely than low Gerson scorers. As shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8, reaction times for all adjectives on
the me/not me judgments tended to be highest when terms were
rated near the middle of the nine point scale, and lowest
when the terms were rated extremely, replicating Kuiper's
(1981) "inverted-U" finding.
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The question this raised was whether high Gerson
scorers might have actually reacted more quickly to the
terms good and Jbad than low Gerson scorers, controlling for
extremity of initial adjective rating. Table 8 sheds light
on this question. It compares frequent and infrequent
splitters in terms of the ratio formed by dividing the
reaction time for the first me/not me judgment of the words
good and bad by the average reaction time for all adjectives
on the same task, with results organized according to
whether subjects initially rated the words good and bad
schematically or antischematically (deviating by 3 or 4
points from the midpoint on the nine point scale) or
aschematically
.
As Table 8 indicates, the infrequent splitters had
lower observed ratios in all categories, except for the word
good when it was schematically rated. None of the
differences of means between frequent and infrequent
splitters, within categories of schematicism and word, were
statistically significant.
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Table 8. Ratios formed by dividing the mean reaction times
for the words good and bad by the mean reaction time for all
trait adjectives on the first me/not me judgment task, by
degree of schematicism on the good and bad dimensions.
Schematic or
Gerson AntiSchemat ic Aschematic
Word Score Rating n Rating n
good
bad
Low
High
Low
High
.688
.652
.641
.834
12
7
10
9
.601
.815
.735
1 .026
7
11
9
10
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects with high Gerson
scale scores would show more inconsistency in me/not me
judgments than low Gerson scorers. This received limited
support from the fact that the observed differences in mean
consistency rate closely approached statistical significance
when responses under 100 ms were removed from analysis.
Also, the regression of consistency rate for the words good
and bad on actual Gerson scale scores, indicated that
consistency of self -judgment on the good and bad dimensions
declines as tendency to split increases.
The results did not support Hypothesis 2, which
predicted that subjects in the experimental condition would
have lower consistency rates than subjects in the control
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condition. This may be partly due to the fact that the
dichotomous nature of the control variable could not be
circumvented, in the same way that the dichotomous
assignment of subjects to low or high Gerson scale score
status was overcome in the regression equation when actual
scale scores were used as the independent variable.
Inferences to a larger population aside for a moment,
the mean consistency rates observed in the four subsamples
(Figure 3) did follow the pattern predicted by Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2
.
It appears that the large variance in the
consistency variable reduced statistical power to the point
where even big observed differences of mean provided little
basis for inference. Thus, there is some reason to remain
optimistic that the null hypotheses associated with
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 might be rejected in a more
powerful experiment
.
On the other hand, observed differences of means failed
to offer any support at all for Hypothesis 3a or Hypothesis
3b. Thus, there is no evidence that high Gerson scores in
the population is associated with a greater likelihood of
rating the adjectives good and bad self -schematically or
antischematically. However, because there are other features
of schematicism than those measured by simple self-rating on
a dimension (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) , the test of Hypothesis
3 does not constitute a complete test of the general
hypothesis that frequent splitters are more schematic or
antischematic on the good and bad dimensions. This
deficiency of Study 1 is directly addressed in Study 2,
where all three of the Fiske and Taylor (1991) criteria are
used in assessing schematicism.
Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b received no support
from the present results. There is no evidence that high
Gerson scores in the population are associated with lower
reaction latencies in making conscious me/not me judgments
about the terms good or bad.
The most elegant interpretation of these results is
that the high Gerson scorers were no more schematic or
antischematic on the good/bad dimension than low Gerson
scorers. Thus, they did not rate the words grood or Jbad more
extremely self-descriptive and did not respond to them more
rapidly. The lower consistency rate in me/not me judgments,
in this view might be due to something other than splitting,
such as a more muddled sense of self, or a greater tendency
to respond to subtle demand features of the experiment.
Given the weak power of the present experiment,
however, and the incomplete measurement of schematicism, it
seems premature to draw any firm conclusions. I critiqued
Study 1 with the goal of improving power in a follow-up
experiment to retest the original hypotheses and a few
additional ones.
One problem, the large variance between the individual
consistency rates of subjects, can only be remedied to the
62
extent that this variance includes error. The part of the
sample variance which reflects real variance in the
population is inevitable in any sample, but sample variance
due to measurement errors could potentially be reduced.
In Study 1 a subject responded to each adjective once
in each me/not me judgment trial. Thus, a single response
error could make what would have been a consistent response
inconsistent, or vice versa. If, in contrast, a subject
responded several times to each adjective, simple response
errors would contribute less to variance in overall
consistency rate, or consistency rate for a given adjective.
Another way to tame the large variances in consistency
rates would be to sample more subjects, taking advantage of
the fact that N and n serve in the denominator of the
formula for standard error. Unfortunately, practical
considerations made 40 subjects the maximum number that
could be included in an experiment like this one.
Study 1 did not include a manipulation check other than
some discussion during debriefing about the impact of the
music upon the subjects' mood. Some subjects reported having
entered the mood of the music and described their feelings
about the music in some detail, but many subjects reported
that they had experienced little mood change. Unfortunately,
this information was not systematically gathered.
Interestingly, a number of subjects reported being
sufficiently alarmed by the language of the informed consent
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form that they later believed they had resisted mood
induction without really intending to do so.
Thus, Study 1 is open to the criticism that it failed
in some cases to induce the intended moods and that it is
now impossible to sort out where mood induction worked and
where it did not. This criticism is directly relevant to
interpretations of data relating to Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2 because the dependent variable for the test of
these hypotheses (consistency rate) involves a measure taken
after the second variable mood induction. The tests of
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, in contrast, involved data
taken prior to any mood induction, and two of the three
measures used to test Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b were
taken before the variable mood induction.
Another problem with this experiment, relevant only to
the test of Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b, involves the
reliability of time measurements using the internal timer of
the PC. The technical issues are detailed in Appendix A.
Here it should be noted that although timing error was a
major source of variance in all the timing data it could at
least be treated as random error. Thus, even if timing error
lowered the power of statistical tests it did not bias them.
Another criticism of Study 1 deals with the fact that
it only employs transparent measures of self -judgment . This
raises important issues. First, it increases the likelihood
that subjects understand, on some level, what is expected of
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them in the study. Some subjects may tend to comply with
such an implicit demand, even as others may tend to go
against the grain of expectation.
Because the judgment tasks are all aimed at subjects'
conscious sense of self, there is also a likelihood that
simple desire to maintain a consistent self-image entered
the equation for some subjects. Consistency of self-image is
apparently important for most people, in life as in
experimental situations (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, pp. 218-223)
.
There is no a priori reason to think that the need for
consistent self-image is any less significant to borderlines
or other frequent splitting persons, except that with
frequent splitters inconsistency is more likely to be dealt
with via splitting instead of the less dramatic methods
employed by people who do not often split. In any case, it
would be nice to have measures of current sense of self
which are not so vulnerable to either demand effects or a
desire for self -consistency
.
The fact that only conscious measures of sense of self
were employed also raises an interesting theoretical point.
Although a sense of self is undoubtedly a crucial component
of many day to day decisions and judgments, it is often
located in the cognitive background, not at front center
stage as the tasks of study 1 demand.
When one has developed a fairly inclusive, coherent,
singular sense of self, calling it directly into
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consciousness may make little difference to its information
processing effects. But what if one harbors two split self-
images? In this case is it not possible that by directly
bringing self -concept to the forefront of consciousness one
also increases the chance that inconsistencies between
current feedback about the self and the activated side of
self-concept will arouse partial awareness of the opposite
sense of self?
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the bringing to
consciousness of the contradiction between the activated and
deactivated self -representations represents a failure of
splitting, necessitating further defense such as denial,
isolation of affect, etc. One presumes that any such
defensive operations use up limited cognitive capacity to a
certain degree. This would impair any other mental
processing occurring at the same time (such as those
demanded by the judgment tasks of Study 1) with slowing of
reaction a natural secondary effect.
Thus, an additional reason for desiring measures of an
activated sense of self which does not directly call the
qualities of that sense of self into consciousness, is that
unconscious measures of self-concept are less likely to call
into play a series of other defenses which may complicate
the results.
A final criticism of Study 1 deals with the Gerson
scale, which has been little studied since its introduction
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in 1984. Although Glassman (1986) examined its formal
psychometric qualities, shortening it by half as a result of
his findings, the scale has received little testing to
establish its validity. Before Gerson's scale is used again
it is desirable to see if it is associated in ways we would
expect of a splitting measure with other variables contained
in the prescreening data base.
Summary
In this chapter I described the procedures and
hypotheses associated with Study 1, presented results from
statistical tests of the hypotheses, and drew conclusions
regarding the validity of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY TWO
Study 2 was organized with three goals in mind: 1) to
test the validity of the Gerson scale, 2) to retest several
of the hypotheses from Study 1, or variations of them, with
improved statistical power, and 3) to test additional
hypotheses involving unconscious aspects of self -concept in
frequent and infrequent splitters.
Methods
This section describes the procedures of Study 2
.
Sampling
Study 2 used the same prescreening and sampling
procedures used previously in Study 1. The final sample for
Study 2 included 21 subjects with low Gerson scale scores (3
males, 18 females) and 20 subjects with high Gerson scale
scores (3 males, 17 females) . Low Gerson scores ranged from
1 to 4, and high scores ranged from 20 to 25.
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study Procedures
A detailed description of procedures used in Study
2 is available in Appendix B. Only a general description of
procedures is presented here.
My assistants and I conducted Study 2 in a small
experimental room at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. The room contained a desk, two chairs, and a single
IBM- compatible PC .
An assistant or I met with each subject for the hour
the study procedures required. We welcomed students to the
study and read the informed consent form to them. Once the
form was signed, the study began.
We led subjects to falsely believe that procedures they
would undergo were intended to aid the development of a new
type of cognitive test. This deception was used to explain
the presence of speed and accuracy tests for which subjects
would receive mood- inducing performance feedback, as
outlined below and described in detail in Appendix B.
After providing some demographic data in response to
prompts on the computer monitor, subjects were prompted by
computer to describe their current mood using a maximum of
three adjectives. Then the computer asked subjects to
provide two adjectives which they considered extremely self-
descriptive and important. Subjects were also asked to
provide antonyms for these two words, yielding a total of
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two words labelling idiographic schematic traits and two
words labelling idiographic antischematic traits.
The computer then presented an increasingly difficult
reverse digit recall test and gave all subjects rigged
feedback indicating very poor performance in relation to
peers. This constituted the dysthymic mood induction. The
computer probed for mood after the induction was completed.
Next the computer directed subjects to watch a
bracketed area of the monitor and to observe masking symbols
that were flashed there. Subjects were then asked to judge
whether a succession of trait terms subliminally presented
in the masked location were better defined as me or not me.
Registering this judgment required subjects to press an
appropriate keyboard key as rapidly as possible after they
formed an "intuition" about which response (me or not me)
was best. Subjects were tested 60 times, with each of 10
adjectives being presented six times. The 10 adjectives
included the terms good, bad, loving, hateful, passive, and
assertive, as well as the four idiographic terms provided by
the particular subject.
Next the computer randomly presented the adjectives, in
a fully perceptible way, six times each. Subjects were again
asked to make me/not me judgments as rapidly as possible.
We then showed the subjects card 9GF of the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) and asked them to rate the two
characters on the card on the 10 trait dimensions.
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Next we attempted a happy mood induction by having
subjects respond via computer to a sham test of their
ability to distinguish a particular symbol, in a fast and
accurate manner, from other symbols presented rapidly on the
monitor. Subjects then received rigged feedback to the
effect that they had performed very well on this test. The
tasks involving subliminal and perceptible presentation of
trait adjectives were repeated and mood was queried.
Subjects were then debriefed and dismissed.
On the Lack of a Control Group
Study 2 contained no control group. All subjects
received the same experimental manipulations (the
performance feedback) in the same order. This creates
problems in interpreting results, of course, and the
decision not to use a control group was not made lightly.
The labor intensive experimental procedure, which
required the presence of the experimenter for one hour with
each subject, made it impossible to run more than 40
subjects in the time that was available. Because half had to
be frequent splitters, and half infrequent splitters, the
projected n was 20 for each subgroup. Any further division
of the subgroups, for example, into control and experimental
groups, would have reduced the n of subgroups to 10, as in
Study 1. In Study 1 statistical power was poor, in major
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part because of the low numbers of subjects in identifiable
subgroups. Power simply had to be improved in Study 2, and
because most of the major hypotheses dealt with differences
between frequent and infrequent splitters, and not the
effect of manipulations, per se, eliminating the control
group seemed reasonable.
The reader should keep in mind, however, that because
of the lack of a control group in Study 2, the idea that
manipulations caused any given effects must always be taken
with a grain of salt. Inferences about differences between
frequent and infrequent splitters, under the sort of
conditions subjects experienced in this study, stand on more
solid ground.
Scoring the Mood Data
An independent evaluator, unaware of the purpose of the
mood data, compared the blocks of mood responses from
immediately before and after the mood inductions, and judged
whether mood was more or less euthymic in the second block.
The evaluator examined responses of the 34 subjects who
showed some response variation across the four mood
enquiries. Table 9 summarizes the results.
It is especially noteworthy that although 23 of the 34
subjects reported less euthymic mood after receiving
negative performance feedback, only 8 reported a more
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euthymic mood after the positive feedback.^ This suggests
that although the first mood induction was generally
effective the second one may not have been.
Close analysis of subjects' later mood responses, and
information from the debrief ings with subjects after the
experiment, suggest that by the time of the second mood
induction most subjects were tired (and often irritable) as
a result of paying close attention to repetitious
procedures. Any positive effect of favorable performance
feedback seems to have been diluted, and even negated, by
the fatigue which had by that point set in. This conclusion
is supported by the fact that results from the second half
of the experiment are negligible, reflecting what appears to
be fairly random responding to the major experimental tasks.
Accordingly, I decided not to report results from the second
half of Study 2 in the present report.
Instead of relying on an omnibus measure of mood change
(euthymia/dysthymia) I grouped mood responses under four
categories: anger, boredom, anxiety, and sadness. For
example, responses such as "annoyed", "mad", and "angry"
were considered indicative of anger. Appendix C lists other
terms categorized under each heading.
' Only mood change, and not absolute euthymia is at
issue here A subject could be judged as less euthymic from
Time 1 to Time 2 and yet have responded in both instances
m
a way which suggested general euthymia.
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Table 9. Number of subjects judged more or less euthymic
after the mood inductions, by overall response pattern.
More or Less Euthymic ?
At ter
Positive
11 r eeuDacK
1 1
6\j 4.
10
1 no change +
-I1 no change
1 + no change
7 no change
4 no change no change
7 (all mood responses identical)*
iOLa± 23 14
Total + 5 8
Total no change 6 12
'These subjects responded identically to the four mood
queries. In contrast, the 4 subjects categorized as "no
change" under both mood inductions respond differently, but
these differences were not judged more or less euthymic.
Four dichotomous variables were established to indicate
whether or not a subject expressed anger, sadness, anxiety,
or boredom in the mood inquiries temporally associated with
the first block of experimental tasks. Each variable was
coded zero if a subject gave no response indicative of the
respective affect, or a response indicative of its opposite.
Thus, a response of "happy" resulted in a zero code under
the variable for sadness. A value of one, on the other hand,
was coded if a subject indicated "sadness" in some way.
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Merging Prescreenina and Study Data
The psychology department provided access to the SPSS
system file containing extensive data on each of the
hundreds of undergraduates prescreened at the beginning of
the semester, including the 41 participants in the present
study. I generated a new SPSS file containing only the data
for these 41 students, sorted it by social security number,
and imported into it the data from Study 2
.
This gave me access to more than 1,000 variables
generated either by the present research or by other
researchers during the prescreening administration. This was
fortuitous in that it made it possible to compare Gerson
scale scores with a borderline personality disorder scale,
and prescreening scores on the Beck Depression Inventory,
the Spielberg Anxiety Scale, and other interesting
psychological measures.
Validating the Gerson Splitting Scale
The present study's reliance on Gerson' s splitting
scale cannot be overemphasized. The scale was integral to
the disproportional stratified method of sampling, and its
validity is thus of prime importance.
I have already discussed Glassman's (1986) psychometric
validation of the Gerson scale. In Study 2 I tested its
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construct validity by seeing if it correlated with variables
one would expect to be associated with splitting.
Because people with borderline personality disorder
comprise one of the largest groups engaging in frequent
splitting, any scale which purports to assess predisposition
to splitting should correlate very highly with a valid
borderline scale. Thus, I predicted that the Gerson scale
would correlate positively with ten items most indicative of
borderline personality in the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory (Millon, 1987) , also administered during
prescreening . The observed correlation among all prescreened
subjects of .5064 (p<.01) supports the prediction.
I also predicted that Gerson scale score would
correlate positively with Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
score and Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) score
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) . These predictions
were based on the psychoanalytic view of splitting as an
indicator of underdeveloped defensive ability, overreliance
on "primitive" splitting-based defenses, and underuse of
more efficient defenses based on repression (Blanck &
Blanck, 1974) . Less efficient defenses should correlate with
greater psychological distress, including depression and
anxiety (Kernberg, 1975)
.
The observed correlations between Gerson scale score
and BDI (.5189, p<.01) and STAI (.6458, p<.01) for all
prescreened subjects support these predictions.
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As Lerner and Lerner (1982) and Lerner (1991) noted,
intrapsychic splitting can manifest as differential
projections onto two figural percepts. Thus, I expected the
frequent splitting experimental group to differentiate the
two TAT characters on the 6 standard and 4 idiographic trait
terms. The results presented in Table 10 support these
predictions. Differentiation of TAT characters (x) was
computed quite simply: x=E
|
(TATj - TATj)
| ,
where TAT^ refers to the numerical score a subject's first
named character received on a given trait dimension, and
TATj refers to the score the second named character received
on the same trait dimension.
Table 10. Results of t-tests comparing mean differentiation
of TAT characters by frequent and infrequent splitters.
Variables mean
Gerson Group
n
(se)
t
(df
)
Standard TAT
Infrequent 6.095
Splitters
Frequent 9.150
Splitters
21
20
4 .76
(1 .04)
5 .22
(1.17)
-1
. 95
(38.23)
029
Idiographic TAT
Infrequent
Splitters
Frequent
Splitters
4 .000
5 .750
21
20
1.87
(0.41)
4.06
(0.91)
-1.76
(26 .42)
045
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The predicted covariance of Gerson Scale scores with
other indicators of splitting was fully observed, providing
construct validation for the Gerson Scale.
Retesting Hypotheses from Study One
I was able to retest several of the hypotheses of Study
1, although due to differences in experimental setup these
retests fall short of true replications.
As in Study 1, I expected frequent splitters to show
greater inconsistency than infrequent splitters in their
me/not me judgments of fully perceptible trait adjectives
following negative performance feedback versus positive
performance feedback.
In Study 1 subjects responded once following a happy
mood induction and once following either a repeat of the
happy mood induction or a sad mood induction. Consistency of
response was simple to measure; either the two responses
matched or they didn't.
In Study 2, however, subjects responded six times to
each perceptibly presented trait term after the negative
feedback and six more times after the positive feedback.
Allowing for some response error, I took the majority
response to a trait term, within a given block of trials, tc
represent "true" response. Consistency could then be
measured as it was in Study 1
.
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The mean consistency rate for all trait terms was 1.0
for infrequent splitters but only .96 for frequent
splitters. This difference of means was quite close to
statistical significance (t(19)=1.71, p<.052).
This result is consistent with those for Hypothesis 1
in Study 1. The raw data from the two studies cannot be
combined directly because the data were derived using
different procedures. Nevertheless, the odds of achieving
respective p values of .065 and .052, if the general
underlying hypothesis is incorrect, must be considerably
less than either p value because the odds of getting two
results is the product of the individual probabilities, in
this case .003. Thus, I consider the underlying hypothesis
strongly supported by the two studies: frequent splitters
are more prone to make inconsistent me/not me judgments
under conditions of contrasting mood inductions.
Strong evidence from Study 1 persuaded me I was wrong
to expect frequent splitters to rate trait adjectives such
as good, or bad, more extremely like or unlike the self than
infrequent splitters. In fact, based on results from Study
1, I suspected the opposite was true. If so, I saw no reason
to dismiss the equally counterintuitive prediction that
infrequent splitters are more schematic on the dimensions
good and bad than frequent splitters, according to the
criteria for schematicism set out by Fiske and Taylor
(1991) .
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were both rated fairly aschematically
. Antonyms for the
idiographic schematic terms, and for the standard terms
loving, good, and assertive are almost without exception
ranked in inverse order, with negative schematicism scores.
Table 11. Trait terms ranked in descending order by mean
schematicism for all subjects.
bad -7.54
Antonym for 2nd idiographic term -11.49
hateful -12.07
Antonym for 1st idiographic term -13.76
The predominance of idiographic terms at the extremes
and the nearly perfect symmetry of the scores suggest that
schematicism was measured here in a valid manner. Additional
support for the validity of this measure of schematicism
comes from nonlinear regression of mean reaction time for
the me/not me judgment of perceptibly and subliminal ly
presented trait terms on mean schematicism scores for the
various terms. The best-fitting regression curve resembled
Kuiper's (1981) classic " inverted-U" , as reflected in Figure
9 and Figure 10.
Term
Mean Schematicism
Score
First idiographic schematic term
Second idiographic schematic term
loving
good
Assertive
Passive
14 .22
12 .61
12 .27
7 .80
2 .68
-2 .93
81
2 900
Schematicism
Figure 9 Mean reaction time in
milliseconds (ms) , for the 10
stimulus adjectives
,
presented
perceptibly for the first
time, by mean schematicism
score
.
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Schematicism
Figure 10. Mean reaction time
in milliseconds (ms) , for the
10 stimulus adjectives,
presented subliminally for the
first time, by mean
schematicism score.
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As predicted, and as reflected in Table 12, infrequent
splitters had more extreme observed schematicism scores
(i.e., further from zero) than frequent splitters for the
words good, bad, loving, and hateful. (The difference of
means is statistically significant for good, loving, and
hateful, but is not quite significant in the case of jbad.)
Differences of means were not significant for idiographic
terms or the words assertive and passive.
Table 12. Results of t-tests comparing the mean schematicism
scores for frequent and infrequent splitters, for the words
good, bad, loving, and hateful.
Trait Term
Splitting Single
Group Tail
mean n sd t df p
good
Infrequent 9.429 21 4.52 1.81 32 .04
Frequent 6.100 20 1.55
Jbad
Infrequent -8.952 21 4.96 -1.51 34 .07
Frequent -6.050 20 7.11
loving
Infrequent 15.333 21 4.75 3.71 36 .000
Frequent 9.050 20 6.00
hateful
Infrequent-15.333 21 4.74 -4.02 37 .000
Frequent -8.650 20 5.82
Note. Separate estimates of variance used in computing t
Degrees of freedom value rounded to nearest integer.
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IThe last aspect of Study 1 which I retested in Study 2
j
involved reaction time. Results of Study 1 did not confirm
the original prediction that frequent splitters would enjoy
a speed advantage in making me/not me judgments when the
words good or bad were presented perceptibly. Despite the
fact that the data of Study 2 allowed somewhat more
sophisticated testing, results still failed to confirm the
original prediction.
Once again the lack of reaction time results may be due
to the sort of timing "noise" discussed in Appendix A. This
said, it is still worth noting that although frequent
j
splitters rated themselves significantly less schematically
on the terms good, loving, and hateful, (contrary to
original expectations)
,
they did not also suffer the speed
disadvantage one would expect to flow from decreased I
schematicism. This suggests the interesting possibility that
I
schematicism, as measured by Fiske and Taylor (1991) , does
not covary with less conscious measures of schematicism in
'
the same way it does for infrequent splitters.
New Hypotheses in Study Two
The data base from Study 2 is richer than that from
Study 1 thanks to the addition of tasks involving subliminal
presentation of trait terms, the TAT indicator of splitting,
etc. This permitted me to test several new hypotheses
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dealing with response differences between frequent and
infrequent splitters when stimuli are presented
subliminal ly
.
Hypothesis 5a. Sh
. 5c. and
Even though frequent splitters have not been shown to
respond more rapidly to the terms good, had, loving, or
hateful when these are perceptibly presented, I predicted
greater speed on the subliminal tasks. This prediction was
based on speculation that activation of a self -schema would
have a more pure effect on processing efficiency when
uncomplicated by conscious considerations involved in any
self -judgment
.
For example, subliminal presentation of stimuli would
presumably minimize demand effects, effects based on a
desire to appear consistent, and so forth.
Also, it seemed possible that when frequent splitting
subjects were asked to make conscious self -judgments on
schematic dimensions they became aware not only of the
currently activated side of the split but also the muted,
but not entirely forgotten deactivated side of the split. If
such a process complicated the self -judgment it would also
slow reaction time. Subliminal presentation, I speculated,
would avoid any such complication. Thus, frequent splitters
could conceivably show faster reaction times on the
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subliminal tasks, relative^ lo tlieir b.uu^liiu- foarticMi ::p<M>i1.
than infrequent splitters, ovru iL iniirqvuMa Iium::
showiul l.u;ter t imor. wIumi si inui 1 i were pi riuMiUnl pcM n^pi ibly.
For these reasons, iiypoi lu-^is 5a stat<-: t luii on i lu^
first subliminal task the frequent s[ilitt(M:: will i.-^^pond
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rel Lit ivc to their i oacl i un L imo I o l lie i li i .ipli i i i a i l
terms
.
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when asked to "guess" whether the consciously unperceived
word is me or not me.
These hypotheses are predicated upon the idea that
activation of a self -schema primes a person to respond to
stimuli closely associated with the schema. In the case of
subliminally presented stimuli, such priming should result
in less random judgments of self -descriptiveness . Thus, if a
good self-schema has been activated, a subject should be
able to respond less randomly when asked to guess if the
subliminally presented word good is self-descriptive or not.
Nonrandomness would manifest as response
directionality- -a definite surplus of me over not me
responses, or vice versa. Using a statistical measure of
nonrandom response pattern, a statistic I created and dubbed
the improjbajbili ty score, I developed four hypotheses
predicting that frequent splitters would respond less
randomly to certain stimuli on the subliminal tasks.
Specifically, Hypothesis 6a predicts that frequent
splitters will achieve higher improbability scores for the
word good on the first subliminal task.
Hypothesis 6b predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on the
first subliminal task.
Hypothesis 6c predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word loving on
the first subliminal task.
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Hypothesis 6d predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word hateful on
the first subliminal task.
Results
In this section I present results of tests of
hypotheses 5a through 6d.
Hypotheses 5a. 5b. 5c. and 5d
Hypothesis 5a states that on the first subliminal task
the frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than
infrequent splitters to the words good, relative to their
reaction time to the idiographic trait terms.
Hypothesis 5b states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent
splitters to the words bad, relative to their reaction time
to the idiographic trait terms
,
Hypothesis 5c states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent
splitters to the words loving, relative to their reaction
time to the idiographic trait terms
.
Hypothesis 5d states that on the first subliminal task the
frequent splitters will respond more rapidly than infrequent
splitters to the words hateful, relative to their reaction
time to the idiographic trait terms.
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Table 13 lays out the evidence, showing that there is
no basis for rejecting the null hypotheses associated with
hypotheses 5a or 5b. Contrary to predictions the observed
reaction times for the words good and bad, relative to
reaction times for the idiographic terms, were actually
slower for frequent than infrequent splitters.
Table 13. Results of t-tests comparing ratios formed by
dividing mean reaction times for words good, bad, loving,
and hateful by mean reaction times for idiographic trait
terms, by splitting groups, for 1st me/not me judgment of
subliminally presented trait adjectives.
hyp: Mfe ratio *^ MiB ratio
Gerson Ratio with Two
Scale Average Idiographic Tail
Word Score RT (ms) Traits n t df P
Good Low 1039 1 .528 21 .525 37 .541
High 1389 1 .633 19
Bad Low 1155 1.694 21 .656 38 .966
High 1429 1 .702 19
Loving
3.37 23 .002Low 1099 1 .216 21
High 1272 .908 19
Hateful
.325Low 1104 1.190 21 .46 38
High 1547 1.140 19
Note. Separate estimates of variance used in computing t
Degrees of freedom value rounded to nearest integer.
In contrast, as reflected in Table 13, observed
reaction times for the words loving and hateful, relative to
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reaction times for the idiographic terms, were faster for
frequent than infrequent splitters. However, only in the
case of the word loving was this difference of speed
statistically significant. Thus, the null hypothesis
associated with Hypothesis 5c can be rejected, but not the
null hypothesis associated with Hypothesis 5d.
Hypotheses 6a. 6b. 6c. and 6d
Hypothesis 6a predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word good on the
first subliminal task.
Hypothesis 6b predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on the
first subliminal task.
Hypothesis 6c predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word good on the
second subliminal task.
Hypothesis 6d predicts that frequent splitters will
achieve higher improbability scores for the word bad on the
second subliminal task.
The construction of the improbability score is
complicated, and is fully discussed for interested readers
in Appendix D. For present purposes it should suffice to say
that this score represents the improbability of achieving
the observed pattern of me/not me responses for a given
90
trait term by pure chance alone, as calculated by the
binomial theorem. The higher the improbability score the
less likely the observed pattern is due to chance alone.
Table 14 presents the average improbability weights for
frequent and infrequent splitters and a t-test of hypothesis
that ptf, i ptie.
Table 14. Results of t-tests comparing mean improbability
scores for response patterns to the words good, bad, loving,
and hateful for frequent and infrequent splitters, for the
1st subliminal task
.
Mean Improbability Score hyp: iitB> Mib
Frequent
Word Splitters
Infrequent
Splitters t df P
Good 14.399 5 .726 -1.87 20 .98 .032t
Bad 5.106 6 .001 .40 32 .17 .6884:
Loving 11.675 6 .510 -1.20 21 .121t
Hateful 6.055 5 .453 - .42 33 .338t
t One-tailed p.
^ Two-tailed p.
Only in the case of the word good in the first did the
mean improbability weights differ sufficiently between
frequent and infrequent splitters to reject the null
hypothesis that = /^ib •
A subject's overt schematicism on the trait dimensions
is a potentially important mediating variable in determining
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nonrandomness of response to any subliminally presented
trait term. Having already seen that frequent splitters
tended to rate themselves less schematically on the terms
good and jbad than infrequent splitters, it seemed likely
that the effect of splitting would be enhanced if
schematicism was statistically controlled.
Thus, I regressed improbability scores for all terms on
schematicism and splitting scale scores. In the case of the
words good and loving the effect of tendency to split was
enhanced by controlling schematicism, as reflected in Table
15 and Table 16. This shows that splitting and schematicism
were both positively associated with nonrandom responding to
the words good and loving on the first subliminal task.
Table 15. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word g^ood in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism on
the good dimension and splitting scale score.
Variable B SE Beta t P
Schematic ism2 .820 .402 .329 2 .038 .049$
Schematicism - .000 .039 - .003 - .020 .9844:
Splitting
Scale Score
.551 .234 .371 2.359 .012t
Constant 3 .246 3 .698 .878 .386$
Total J? = .177
, ^ -,
Incremental R' due to splitting variable, after controlling
for schematicism =.124
tOne-tailed p.
4: Two-tailed p.
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Thinking that mood might also mediate the effect of
splitting tendency on response to subliminal stimuli, I
entered mood variables in the family of regressions of
improbability scores for the words good, bad, loving, and
hateful in post hoc analysis. At the same time, I
considered the possibility that differentiation of TAT
characters, one indicator of splitting, would also mediate
the independent effect of tendency to split.
Table 16. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word loving in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism
on the loving dimension and splitting scale score.
Variable B SE Beta t P
Schematicism^ 1 .045 .381 .480 2 .741 .0094:
Schematicism .046 .049 .143 930 .3594:
Splitting
Scale Score
.541 .228 .404 2 .378 .012t
Constant .690 3 .846 . 179 .8594:
Total R = .199
Incremental i?' due to splitting variable, after controlling
for schematicism = .122
t One-tailed p.
4: Two-tailed p.
The entire family of regressions included 16 models,
because there were four dependent variables (improbability
scores for the trait terms good, bad, loving, and hateful)
and four mood variables (anger, sadness, boredom, and
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anxiety)
.
Thus, Bonferroni correction dictated that mood
variables achieve a p value of less than .003125 (.05/16) to
be considered statistically significant. There was only one
instance in which this stringent criterion was met: as
reflected in Table 17 the independent variable anger was
associated with a p value of .003 in the regression of
improbability score for the word good.
Table 17. Results of regression of improbability scores for
the word good in the 1st subliminal task on schematicism on
the good dimension, the mood variable for anger,
differentiation of TAT characters, and splitting scale
score
.
Variable B SE Beta t p
Schematicism, .761 .357 .305 2 .135 .0394:
Schematicism - .006 .035 - .023 -.167 8684:
Anger 24 .921 7 .775 .439 3 .205 .0034:
TAT - .664 .279 - .341 -2 .381 .023*
Splitting
Scale Score
.550 .211 .370 2 .608 .006t
Constanj: 9 .873 4 .165 2 .370 .023*
Total R =.42
Incremental due to Splitting variable, after cont]
for schematicism =.113
Incremental R' due to anger variable =.223
t One-tailed p
* Two-tailed p
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Comparison of Table 15 and Table 17 is interesting
because of the dramatic increase in from .177 to .42, the
difference chiefly attributable to the anger variable. Note
that the B coefficient associated with anger, like that
associated with splitting scale score, is positive,
indicating that both tendency to split and anger correlated
independently and positively with nonrandom responding to
the word good on the first subliminal task.
Interestingly, removing the independent variable
measuring differentiation of characters on the TAT card
decreased the "explanatory power" of both the anger and
splitting variables (result not shown) . That is, removing
TAT differentiation significantly lowered the incremental
values associated with both anger and splitting score.
In trying to understand this phenomenon I noted that
the coefficients associated with the TAT variable were
negative, in contrast to the positive coefficients
associated with anger and the splitting scale score.
Furthermore, the TAT coefficients were negative before other
variables were entered in a stepwise regression, and
remained so throughout. Also, I noted that the explanatory
power and statistical significance of the TAT variable
increased as the anger variable and splitting scale score
were entered in a stepwise manner.
This pattern of results would make sense if one assumed
that nonrandom responding to the word good and the act of
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significantly differentiating TAT characters both expressed
a tendency to split, and if one further assumed that doing
one lessened the need to do the other. That is, where
splitting was expressed in a strongly nonrandom response
pattern to the subliminally presented word good the
psychological need to split the TAT characters diminished.
In other words, the more frequently a subject split,
and the angrier she was, the greater the saliency of
judgments about the "goodness" of the self. This manifested
in an increase in nonrandom responding to the subliminally
presented word good. However, an angry and frequent
splitting subject who for some reason was unable to respond
nonrandomly to the subliminally presented term (perhaps due
to a very high perceptual threshold, or boredom with the
task and resulting inattention) retained a tendency to split
after the subliminal task, and was thus more likely to find
expression in the TAT task.
Note that the temporal ordering of experimental tasks
does not actually justify entering TAT as an independent
variable in a test of improbability scores, because the
latter data were derived first in time. Thus, to test my
speculations appropriately I used multiple regression to
test the effects of various variables, including the
improbability weight of the response pattern to the word
good on the first subliminal task, on differentiation of TAT
characters
.
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All mood variables, splitting scale score, and measures
of schematicism for the word good were also entered if p
value associated with them was less than .2. Once all
eligible items were entered, items were removed if the p
value associated with them exceeded .25. This process
resulted in the elimination of angry mood as an independent
variable. However, as reflected in Table 18, splitting scale
score was positively associated with TAT differentiation, as
predicted, but nonrandomness of response to the subliminal
word good was negatively associated with TAT
differentiation, again as predicted. However, the
incremental value associated with the improbability score
for the word good is quite small (.03), lending little
credence to my speculation.
Summary
In this chapter I described the procedures and
hypotheses associated with Study 2, presented results from
statistical tests of the hypotheses, and drew conclusions
regarding the validity of the hypotheses.
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Table 18. Results of regression of differentiation of TAT
characters on schematic rating of the word good,
improbability scores associated with responses to the word
good on the 1st subliminal task, the mood variables, and
splitting scale score, after removal of items with p values
greater than 0.25.
Variable B SE Beta t P
Schematicism
Schematicism^ • 0260 .0187 2041 1
.
386 .1744t
Improbability
Score for Word
CTOnci on Ft T"c:f
*-f \-y \-/ V—1. \yX X X. -i- X. ibD
Subliminal Task .1509 .0765 - .2937 -1 .973 .02814:
Boredom 5 .4683 3.6960 .2135 1 .480 .1477t
Splitting
Scale Score .2771 .1157 .3634 2 .395 .OlU
Cpnstant 9 .1103 1.8252 4 .992 .ooot
R =.290
Incremental due to splitting variable = .080
Incremental R^ due to improbability variable =,031
t One-tailed p.
t Two-tailed p.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In this chapter I summarize the major findings, discuss
important limitations of the study, and offer suggestions
for further research in this area.
Summary of Results
The two experiments, taken together, provide fairly
convincing evidence that college students obtaining low
Gerson scale scores are likely to rate themselves more
extremely on the global trait dimensions srood, Jbad, loving,
and hateful than comparable students obtaining high Gerson
scale scores
.
High Gerson scorers showed a greater tendency, in both
studies, to respond inconsistently to trait terms presented
perceptibly
.
Gerson scale scores failed to covary significantly with
reaction times for the words good, bad, or hateful on the
tasks involving either perceptible stimuli or subliminal
stimuli
.
Interestingly, a greater tendency to split was
associated with lower reaction time for the word loving on
the first subliminal task.
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splitters. On the other hand, the prediction that frequent
splitters would respond more rapidly to stimuli, relative to
reaction time for idiographic traits, was not supported.
Unfortunately, the design of the second study leaves
room for interpreting the results in different ways. For
example, subjects were asked to rate their own degree of
schematicism on the trait dimensions only once, prior to
other experimental procedures, including the mood
inductions. Thus, one could speculate that frequent
splitters failed to rate themselves more schematically
because neither of their radically opposed self -schemata had
been fully activated by environmental stimuli (e.g., a mood
induction) when the measure was made.
If one imagines a borderline for whom neither the good
self-schema nor bad self-schema has yet been activated,
sense of self may be characterized by the sort of identity
diffusion described by Kernberg (1975) . Such a borderline
could be conceived as existing in a temporary ego state
marked by a very vague (but not complex) sense of self . In
this waiting state an amorphous and impoverished self awaits
an environmental stimulus to push it towards either the good
pole or bad pole.
It is possible that the first (unhappy) mood induction
played the role of environmental stimulus for many frequent
splitters, pushing them out of the waiting condition to a
more schematic condition. This, in turn, would have primed
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them to respond nonrandomly to the key words loving and good
(i.e. schematically) , even though they rated themselves less
schematically than infrequent splitters prior to the mood
induction
.
Such speculation exposes an important flaw in the
design of the second study, namely the assumption that
frequent splitters would be as stable in their subjective
estimation of schematicism on important trait dimensions as
infrequent splitters. The somewhat greater inconsistency of
frequent splitters in responding me or not me to stimulus
words presented perceptibly, as well as general clinical
wisdom regarding frequent splitters, suggests that this
assumption is unwarranted.
Follow-up research in this area could avoid relying
upon the validity of such a dubious assumption by having
subjects rate their schematicism on key traits several times
during the course of a study. This would allow the stability
of schematicism measures to be tested. If significant
variability was found it could be factored into data
analysis. For example, the researcher would have access to a
measure of schematicism proximate to other measures under
study.
The evidence for frequent splitters' increased
nonrandomness of response to the subliminally presented
words good and loving is impressive in my view. This
evidence suggests that frequent splitters experienced more
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priming on the good and loving dimensions, in turn
suggesting a greater salience of these dimensions in the
unconscious of frequent splitters. This conclusion would be
stronger if nonrandom responding covaried with relatively-
faster reaction times, but this was true only in the case of
the word loving on the first subliminal task.
I am inclined to give greater weight to the
nonrandomness results given the problems of accuracy
associated with the timing data (see Appendix A)
.
Nevertheless, the inability of this study to demonstrate
covariance of nonrandom responding and a reaction time
advantage makes it impossible to conclude that frequent
splitters acted more schematically than infrequent splitters
once their schemata were activated by mood induction.
It could be argued, for example, that frequent
splitters responded less randomly to subliminally presented
trait stimuli precisely because they waited longer, on
average, to respond. Length of exposure to the stimuli,
rather than schematic priming, would then explain decreased
randomness of response. Testing this quite plausible
explanation of study results requires timing data more
precise than those obtained in the present studies, as well
as an N large enough to support ANOVA models with two or
more factors
.
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Suggested Future Research
Some of the present results point to areas deserving of
further study. Other results suggest areas which should be
ignored in the next round of research in the interest of
economy. Several suggestions for making future studies more
powerful follow: first, timing data need to more precise. A
device with dedicated timing switches should be used for
recording responses, rather than the inherently less precise
PC keyboard and software interrupt system used in the
present research.
Second, schematicism on critical dimensions needs to be
assessed more than once to permit testing of the hypothesis
advanced above regarding movement of borderline splitters
from an ego state involving aschematicism to one involving
borderline self -schemata
.
Third, a more powerful mood induction procedure is
needed. The musical mood induction procedure described in
Study 1 is one possibility. Another is the procedure
described by Velten (1968) , in which subjects are instructed
to read a series of self -referential statements and asked to
put themselves into the mood suggested by the statements.
So as not to confound the effects of mood and effects
associated with temporal ordering of mood inductions, or
simple fatigue, the ordering of mood inductions in a follow-
up study should be randomly counterbalanced. Measures
of
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schematicism on significant traits need to be taken after
each mood induction to ensure that any variability is noted
and can be statistically controlled in subsequent data
analysis
.
Fifth, it seems advisable to replace free- form mood
measurement with an instrument permitting subjects to be
compared more directly, and quantitatively, on significant
mood dimensions. My choice would be the Visual Analogue Mood
Scales (VAMS) , which requires subjects to mark positions on
lines representing the degree to which they feel tired,
anxious, despondent, sad, happy, angry, and apprehensive
(McCormack, Horne, & Sheather, 1988) . The scale is quickly
administered, ensures comparable data between subjects- -and
within subjects over time if administered repeatedly.
Sixth, an increase in N is desirable so that procedure
order can be counterbalanced to allow for more than two
dichotomous ANOVA factors without producing empty cells.
Seventh, it would be useful to conduct follow-up
studies with a well-defined borderline subsample serving as
the frequent splitting group. This would help ensure maximal
splitting and make the issue of generalizability of results
more clearcut
.
Finally, the combined length of study procedures needs
to be reduced to avoid fatiguing subjects to the point at
which results become suspect. Given the sparse results from
the procedures involving perceptible presentation of
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stimuli, they could be dropped in a future study. Their
elimination alone would cut a 55 minute study to about 40
minutes. As much as another 10 minutes could probably be
trimmed by eliminating deception and the props and
procedures it required. Fortunately, deception would not be
required to make the Velten or musical mood induction
procedures work, another advantage in adopting them.
The standard trait terms passive and assertive could be
eliminated from all tasks, as could the second set of
idiographic trait terms. This would leave 4 standard trait
terms and one set of idiographic terms, for a total of six.
Each could then be repeated ten times during the subliminal
tasks, rather than six, with no increase in the total time
required for the procedure in Study 2, Repeating terms ten
times would allow for more reliable estimates of reaction
time and more powerful measurement of nonrandomness of
response
.
Procedures for the proposed follow-up study are
summarized in Appendix E, which also lists hypotheses to be
tested using the cleaner data this design should yield.
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APPENDIX A
TIMING ERROR
Unable to procure the sophisticated timers usually used
in research involving very rapid reaction times, I was
compelled to use the PC as my timer. The computer program
was written so that after initial presentation of a stimulus
word a counting loop was initiated, continuing either until
a time limit was reached (in which case a nonresponse was
scored) or until an appropriate response key was depressed,
interrupting and terminating the counting loop procedure.
There were several sources of measurement error. After
timing dozens of count cycles from zero to 5,000,000, I
found that the computer averaged 65,832 cycles per second,
but calculations showed variability of as much as ±35 cycles
per second. If this variance had been accrued evenly over
the entire count cycle it would not have been problematic,
inasmuch as an error of 35/65832 seconds (.00053 seconds)
would be negligible. However, this error, attributable to
unpredictable hardware -derived delay in command execution,
was actually accrued only at the very beginning and end of
measurement. Thus, error could amount to as much as 40 ms, a
significant amount.*
Fortunately, this timing error was, for all practical
purposes, random rather than systematic. This requires a bit
of explanation. First, it is important to note that the
error is associated with the point at which a timing
interrupt was initiated in relation to where the CPU was in
its processing or "clock" cycles. This means that the error,
charted over time, would have a cyclical aspect to it. If
the CPU was at clock step 1 the interrupt could not be
enacted till after step 4, and the error would be greatest.
If, however, the CPU was nearly completed with step 4, error
would be minimal. Because the CPU cycled approximately
65,832 times per second (it took one full set of clock steps
to complete one count cycle) this means that the amount of
error which would accrue to a response varied from minimum
to maximum 65,832 times per second. Because no person
responds to experimental tasks of the sort in these
experiments with timing precision approaching 1/65,832
seconds, the cyclical aspect of timing error here becomes an
essentially moot point, and this source of error can be
considered random.
. . ,
.
' It should be understood that this degree of e
represents a maximum, and that actual observed error
test situations tended to be less than this.
107
the latter are very short than when they are very long (an
additional reason to be suspicious of very short reaction
times)
,
but this nonlinearity is negligible above the 100 to
200 ms thresholds for reasonably plausible reaction
latencies. Thus, even though the large contribution of
timing error to general error variance in the reaction time
studies is unfortunate in reducing the power of the
inferential tests at my disposal, its essential randomness
means it need not be taken into further account
.
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR STUDY TWO
We welcomed subjects to the experimental room and
oriented them to the computer keyboard, particularly the
five function keys (Fl through F5) marked in red, and the
five function keys (F8 through F12) marked in green. These
keys were arranged in a single horizontal line across the
top of the keyboard.
Until this point the monitor screen was bright red with
black lettering reading as follows in order to support the
deception
:
AMERICAN PSYCHO-EDUCATIONAL LABORATORIES
Testing Validation and Standardization Program
for Test # 293. Sf 5 -17 is now ready to run.
(copyright 1992)
To be administered only at sites specifically
authorized by APEL.
When we began the computer program a light blue screen
with black lettering appeared. It read as follows:
Thank you for agreeing to help us standardize a new
form of cognitive testing. You and hundreds of other
students are being tested now in study centers across
the USA, using the new computerized methods you will
see demonstrated today. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)
The next screen read:
Some of the procedures will appear very much like
multiple choice testing with which you are already
familiar. However, you will be asked to respond to
these multiple choice questions as rapidly as possible.
Speed of response will be measured and used, along with
the correctness of your response, to evaluate how well
you perform on each test you take today. (Press any
GREEN key to continue)
The next screen read:
Some of the tasks you will be asked to do today will
seem quite different than anything you have ever done
before. Once the testing is over the test administrator
at your center will explain how each of these tasks is
used to create a new index of cognitive functioning.
(Press any GREEN key to continue)
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The next screen read: "Occasionally the program will
ask about your mood at that time. Knowing what your mood is
will help us evaluate your performance more objectively.
(Press any GREEN key to continue)".
The next screen read:
Before we begin testing we want to know a little about
you, and how you see yourself as a person, so we will
be able to understand our results better. Some of this
information will help us validate and standardize the
tests. Some of this information will play a role in the
tests, as you will later see. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)
Next, the computer program prompted subjects to enter
Year of birth, month of birth, day of birth, ethnic
identification and year of college.
Next, the program prompted subjects to "please think of
3 words that best describe you mood at this moment" and
asked them to enter the mood words by typing them on the
keyboard
.
After this a screen read as follows: "Please think of a
quality that is strong in you and important to you. (Press
any GREEN key to continue) "
.
The next screen read: "Now, referring to this quality
that is strong in you and important to you please finish the
following sentence with a single word: I am very ."
After subjects typed in their chosen adjective a follow-up
screen read: "Please enter the word that is the opposite of
the word x" , where "x" represents the word subjects typed in
a moment before. Once an antonym was typed in the cycle was
repeated one more time, yielding four words provided by each
subject.
These 4 adjectives were automatically combined in a
temporary file with 6 standard adjectives used with all
subjects: good, bad, loving, hateful, assertive and passive.
Each adjective was then associated with a unique pseudo-
random number generated by the program (the random number
generator being seeded for each subject with an integer
derived by algorithm from the number of seconds elapsed
since midnight) . This file was then sorted by the value of
the pseudo random numbers, yielding a new file in which the
adjectives were uniquely ordered for each subject.'
Several other unique files of randomly ordered
adjectives were created at the same time, for use in the
various experimental procedures employing the adjectives, so
that the ordering of adjectives varied from task to task, as
well as from subject to subject. Some procedures (described
below) required random presentation of each adjective 6
110
The experimenter now placed a special cover over the
computer keyboard. This cover permitted access only to the
red and green function keys described earlier. This cover,
designed to limit subjects' response options to the function
keys alone, would remain in place for all remaining
procedures, with the exception of the mood checks, which
were repeated several times and are described above.
The computer now prompted the subject to answer the
following question: "How x are you?" (The x represents one
of the randomly presented adjectives.) Five responses were
possible, via the function keys: "Not x at all", "Not too
X"
,
"Average", Fairly x" , and "Extremely x"
.
Immediately after a subject responded to this question
the computer posed a follow-up question, its exact form
dependent upon the subject's first response: "How important
is it to you that you are ?" (The blank represents one
of the following phrases, in conformity with the subject's
previous response: "Not x at all", "Not too x" , "x to an
average degree", "Fairly x" , or "Extremely x" .
)
Possible responses included "Not at all important",
"Not too important", "It is of average importance", "Fairly
important", and "Extremely important". The point of these
questions was to obtain a graded measure of the degree to
which subjects viewed the adjectives self -schematically
.
Once this procedure was completed a new screen appeared
reading "APEL Reverse Digit Memory Test. (Press any GREEN
key to continue) " . The computer was programmed to beep once
at this point in order to alert the researcher of the
beginning of the "reverse digit test."
The next screen read:
Please watch the screen carefully. A bracket will
appear for a very brief time, followed by a number,
which will also disappear after a few moments. Your job
is to observe the number, keep it in mind for several
seconds, and then indicate what the number is
BACKWARDS. The first two trials are for practice.
(Press any GREEN key to begin the test)
times, rather than a single time. The adjective files for
these procedures were constructed in the following way: the
original file of 10 adjectives was read, one adjective at a
time, but each term was then written 6 times to another
temporary file. The 60 terms on the temporary file (10
adjectives written 6 times) were each then associated with
psuedo- random number generated as described above Thus,
when this file was sorted by random number value the
60
terms were effectively randomized.
Ill
We had subjects repeat back instructions in their own
words, as a way of insuring that there was no
misunderstanding .
®
Next, a pair of white brackets, appeared centered
against an otherwise black screen. The brackets remained
visible for approximately 500 ms . The screen was then blank
for approximately 500 ms
.
A three digit number next appeared
in the space which had been previously bracketed. The number
remained visible for approximately 2000 ms . The screen was
then blank for approximately 2000 ms
. Then five three-digit
numbers appeared at the center of the screen, each one
preceded by the name of a function key (Fl through F5)
.
One, and only one, of the numbers represented the
original number with the digits in reverse order. We
checked, during the first two practice trials using three-
digit numbers, to make certain subjects understood how to
judge the correct answer and how to associate their answer
with the appropriate function key.
After the "practice trials" ten additional target
numbers were presented, ranging upward in size from three
digits to nine digits. During pretesting nine digits had
proved sufficient to insure failure at the task . This was
important in making the negative feedback subjects received
after the reverse digit task credible
.
After the last reverse digit trial a screen appeared
for approximately 5 seconds reading "Please wait while the
computer calculates your performance in relation to other
students of your age."
The next screen appeared automatically, with text at
the top indicating that "this graph shows your combined
performance (accuracy plus speed) compared to other students
your age," Below the text a line stretched horizontally
across the screen, with the word "poor" labelling its left
end, the word "excellent" labelling its right end, and the
word "average" labelling the middle. A vertical line,
perpendicular to the horizontal one, and touching the latter
to the left of the word "average", roughly 1/3 the way to
the word "poor", was labelled "Your performance fell about
here. (Below Average)". This screen could not be erased
until approximately 7 seconds had elapsed, after which
additional words appeared at the bottom of the screen:
"(Press any GREEN key to continue)".
The next procedure, the so-called "intuition test", was
introduced this way by the computer:
' This was important because we wanted subjects to feel
they had done their best on this task, in order to enhance
the effect of the negative feedback all subjects received
about their performance at the end of the task.
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Now you will take a test of INTUITION, which is
important in many types of problem solving. In a moment
you will see flashes of light on the screen. These
flashes hide words that you probably won't be able to
read at a conscious level
. You WILL be able to register
the words unconsciously, however. Then you WILL be able
to make guesses about the word you unconsciously
registered by using your intuition. (Press any GREEN
key to continue)
The next screen read:
A moment before the words are flashed you will see a
set of brackets on the screen. This is where the words
will be flashed. Please watch the brackets and flashes
carefully. Then, using your intuition, guess whether
the hidden word describes you as a person. Do not
hesitate! Make your guess as rapidly as possible! If
you guess the hidden word DOES describe you press a
GREEN key. If you guess the hidden word DOES NOT
describe you press a RED key. (Press any GREEN key to
continue)
An audible tone alerted researchers to check with
subjects at this point, to insure that the latter understood
the instructions. Based on the questions subjects asked
here, it was often necessary for us to emphasize that
subjects were unlikely to read the words that would be
flashed, and would instead have to use their "gut feeling"
to correctly guess whether the hidden word described them.
Next, the computer presented white brackets on the
black monitor screen for approximately 2000 ms, followed by
about 500 ms of blank screen. Next, to serve as
frontmasking, a sequence of twelve "greater-than signs"
(>>>>>>>>>>>>), presented for 50 ms, alternated with an
equally long sequence of "less-than signs" (<<<<<<<<<<<<) ,
flashed for the same length of time, over a total period of
1000 ms. Then the target word, one of ten stimulus
adjectives described above, was printed on the screen for
350 ms. Backmasking followed, consisting of the alternating
greater-than sign and less-than signs for another 1000 ms.'
' Backmasking was necessary because the phosphors
comprising pixels on a monitor continue to glow for some
period after they are "commanded" to turn black, resulting
in an afterimage of unacceptable duration. Backmasking
obliterates this afterimage, making the timing of
presentation reasonably precise. In extensive
experimentation prior to the study I determined that
frontmasking helped "subjects" focus on the correct area of
the screen, and reduced their conscious recognition ot
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Timing started at the presentation of the target word,
and ended with either a red keypress or green keypress. A
keypress blackened the screen for 3000 ms, at which point
the next trial began. The computer automatically recorded
the nature of the response and reaction time.
At the end of the intuition procedure subjects were
once again asked to provide three words describing their
present mood. It was explained that they could use the same
mood adjectives they used before, if they wished, indicating
any change of degree with the symbols + or -
.
Next, a tone sounded and the screen went completely
blank. We intervened, informing subjects that they should
turn their chair around to face the experimenter. Subjects
were told that they would next be shown a picture and asked
to construct a story about it
:
Now I will show you a picture. First, I would like you
to give a name to each of the persons in the picture
.
Next, I would like you to tell me a story about what is
happening in the picture, beginning with what happened
before the picture, then telling me what is happening
now, and finally what you think will happen in the
future, after the scene shown in the picture.
We showed subjects card 9GF from the Thematic
Apperception Test, which Groth-Marnat {1990, p. 338)
described this way: "a woman in the foreground is standing
behind a tree. Below her is another woman running along a
beach.
"
I intended the TAT task to provide an independent
measure of splitting with which to compare data from the
intuition procedure. Even though normally it would be
desirable to use several TAT cards in order to detect
splitting, or any other defense, time did not allow the
administration of multiple cards. I chose card 9GF because
it depicts two characters of very similar appearance, thus
providing suitable grist for a split projection, without
pulling for it too directly.
I did not score the stories. Instead, I had subjects
return to the computer, which first prompted them to type m
a name for each TAT character, and then asked questions of
the form "How x is A?" and "How x is B?" (where x represents
one of the ten stimulus adjectives and A and B represent the
respective TAT character names)
.
stimuli without affecting their ability to "guess" correctly
whether they had previously identified the word as me or not
me Length of stimulus presentation in this study was
also
Sased on experimentation with friends and colleagues
prior
to the study
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Response choices were: "Not x at all", "Not too x"
,
"Average", "Fairly x", and "extremely x" . The computer
assigned these responses numerical values from 0 to 4 , and
computed the difference between A and B's scores for each of
the ten stimulus adjectives. The degree to which the
character scores differed would later be interpreted as
evidence of splitting projected onto the TAT card.
Next, the computer presented this screen text:
In order to get to know your innate response speed we
will now ask some easy questions about you as a person.
In a moment you will see descriptive words on the
screen and your task is to decide, as rapidly as
possible, whether the term describes you or does not
describe you. . . Please respond as rapidly as possible
by pressing a key outlined in GREEN if the word does
describe you as a person or a key outlined in RED if
the word does not describe you. Remember: if the word
DOES describe you press a GREEN key. If the word DOES
NOT describe you press a RED key. (Press any GREEN key
to continue)
The next procedure was similar to the intuition task
except that the 60 presentations of the stimulus adjectives
were fully perceptible and no front or back masking was
used. Each term was presented in letters 1.3 cm high for as
long as 5000 ms, or until subjects pressed a red or green
key, terminating the trial. The words were presented in 3
blocks of 20 trials, with 20 second rest periods between
blocks. Again, the computer recorded responses and response
latencies
.
Next, the computer presented a screen reading: "APEL
LATERAL LOCALIZATION TEST PROTOTYPE". Subjects were
instructed to press one of four function keys (FX through
F4) whenever a small cross symbol was flashed on the screen,
Fl if the cross was in the leftmost quadrant of the screen,
F2 if it was in the next quadrant to the right, and so on.
The computer instructed subjects not to press a key whenever
distractor symbols were flashed.
Symbols were next presented for 1000 ms at random
locations along the horizontal line passing through the
screen's center. The researcher observed the first few key
presses to insure that subjects understood the instructions.
After 100 symbols (including 20 crosses) were presented the
screen blanked for a few seconds. Then a graph appeared,
identical to the one used in the reverse digit task, with
the exception that in this case it indicated that sub:ects
performance was "very good" .
. ^ ^ ^v,^
The computer again queried for mood, repeated the
subliminal "intuition test" and the task involving
perceptible stimulus adjective presentation, and queried
mood a final time.
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The computer program terminated with a tone and a blank
screen. We congratulated subjects for finishing the testing.
Still in role, we asked for feedback regarding the test
procedures. The chief purpose of this query was to give
subjects who saw through the experimental deception a good
opportunity to say so, prior to this being directly revealed
to them. No subject expressed doubt about the cover story at
this point. We asked which procedures subjects liked most
and least. Subjects typically reported liking and/or doing
well on the cross symbol test, and not liking and/or not
doing well on the reverse digit test. This provided
additional evidence that subjects did not see through the
deception
.
Finally, we asked what subjects thought of the
subliminal task, and most subjects reported having detected
only a few, if any words. Those subjects who reported having
detected words almost invariably reported that the word they
detected was the first schematic adjective they themselves
provided. In only two instances did subjects report seeing a
standard trait term, and then only once or twice during the
entire procedure. Thus, adjective presentation seems to have
been truly subliminal as intended.
We then informed subjects of the deception and fully
debriefed them. We took special care to make certain they
realized that their performance had never been graded in
relation to others. We then dismissed subjects.
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APPENDIX C
CATEGORIZATION OF MOOD TERMS IN STUDY TWO
Subjects in Study 2 were coded 0 or 1 on mood variables
representing anger, sadness, boredom, and anxiety. Zero was
the default value on these variables. Subjects were also
coded 0 if their mood responses gave positive indication of
not being in the respective mood (e.g., the response happy
resulted in the sadness variable being coded 0)
.
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for angry
mood included angry, annoyed, irritated, and mad.
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for sad
mood included depressed, somber, pessimistic, and Jblue.
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for bored
mood included bored, restless, indifferent, tired, and
unenthusiastic
,
Mood responses that resulted in a coding of 1 for
anxious mood included nervous, geared up, apprehensive,
anxious, hyper, timid, stressed, and u^orried.
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APPENDIX D
THE IMPROBABILITY SCORE FROM STUDY TWO
Imagine that a subject responds completely randomly to
all six subliminal presentations of a given word.
"Completely randomly" means that there is no priming effect
in operation, so that the "guess" really is a random guess.
Furthermore, complete randomness dictates an absence of any
response bias. Thus, for example, the subject cannot have an
inherent bias toward responding me or not me.
Under these conditions the expected results of
randomized responding would be equivalent to the expected
results if we flipped a fair coin for each response, heads
perhaps representing me and tails representing not me. The
binomial theorem is easy to apply in such a case. Table 19
presents the probability of achieving so many me responses
and so many not me responses, in any order, out of six
trials, the probabilities determined by the formula provided
in Blalock (1979)
,
N!
* p' *
,
r! (N-r)
!
where N equals the total number of trials (6 in this case)
,
r equals the number of me responses, p refers to the odds of
getting a me response (1/2 in this case) and q equals the
odds of getting a not me response (again 1/2 in this case)
.
Table 19. Binomial probabilities associated with achieving
different numbers of me and not me responses, in any order,
out of 6 trials, assuming completely random responding.
Number of me Responses Probability
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1/64
1/10 .666
1/4 .266 .
1/3.2
1/4 .266 .
1/10 .666
1/64
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In this unrealistically simple case note that the
probabilities are symmetrical around the most highly
expected result of three we responses out of six trials.
Testing a null hypothesis of random responding with one
subject is easy in this case, because the probability of an
observed response pattern if the null hypothesis is true
equals the probabilities at the right side of Table 19.
Thus, the only patterns which would permit us to reject the
null hypothesis of randomness would be zero we responses or
six we responses, because only these patterns are associated
with p less than .05 (p=.016, to be more precise).
In the present study the problem was not to make
inferences about individual subjects, but rather to see if
frequent splitters responded less randomly to the words good
and bad than infrequent splitters. To do so, I took the
reciprocal of the p values associated with a subject's
observed response pattern, yielding, in essence a weight
corresponding to the improbability of that subject '
s
response pattern assuming that the responding is completely
random . Averaging these weights among frequent splitters and
infrequent splitters, I obtained a measure of the average
improbability of the response patterns
.
Computation of improbability scores for individuals
actually required correction for response bias, because any
tendency to respond we more than not we, or vice versa,
would skew p values.
Although we have no absolute measure of response bias,
we do have a handy value with which to estimate it, namely
the proportion of we to total responses, over all
presentations of all trait adjectives in a given task. The
logic here is that because trait adjectives were paired in
opposites (e.g., good and bad, loving and hateful, etc.) the
disavowal and endorsement of adjectives should balance if
there is no response bias. Under this assumption, anything
other than a .5 proportion of we to total responses reflects
response bias. The observed proportion of we responses was
entered in the binomial equation as p, and the observed
proportion of not we responses was entered as q.
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APPENDIX E
PROCEDURE LIST AND HYPOTHESES FOR PROPOSED FOLLOW-UP STUDY
Procedures
:
1 ) Introduction and informed consent
2 ) Visual Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS)
3 ) Subjects provide idiographic schematic trait terms
4 ) Rating of self - schematic ism (RSS) of trait terms
5 ) Happy or sad mood induction (by constrained random
assignment
)
6 ) VAMS
7 ) RSS
8 ) Subliminal we/not me judgment task
9 ) TAT task
10) Happy or sad mood induction (opposite of #4)
11) VAMS
12) RSS
13) Subliminal me/not me judgment task
14) TAT task
15 ) Debriefing
Major Hypotheses:
1 ) Borderline subjects (BS) will show more variability in
VAMS .
2 ) BS will show more variability in RSS.
3 ) For BS only, variability in VAMS will be positively
associated with variability in RSS.
4 ) BS will achieve higher improbability scores for words
good, bad, loving, and hateful on subliminal tasks.
5 ) Within subjects, improbability scores for different
trait terms will be negatively associated with reaction
time
.
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